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Abstract: This article examines the reliance element of the
securities fraud action. An analysis comparing the economic function
of common law deceit to that of securities fraud is used to appraise
the current law and to propose refinements. This article argues that
neither participants in securities markets nor the society are indiffer*
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ent to the risk of misrepresentations about securities and that this risk
is larger than the risk created by misrepresentations about nonfinancial goods (real goods). Therefore, the fear of misrepresentations
about securities is more undesirable than the fear of misrepresentations about real goods. Consequently, the securities fraud action
should create stronger deterrence than the deceit action. The fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance intensifies the deterrence of
the securities-fraud action by making class actions more likely to succeed and by allowing larger classes, hence, larger damage awards
than under the actual reliance required for deceit liability. Although
the economic analysis supports the expansive securities fraud action
that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance creates, the presumption also has the important drawback that it may be rebutted if
the trader does not "trust the integrity of the market." This rebuttal
exposes informed traders to fraud and, therefore, undermines market
efficiency. It is easy to overcome this drawback (while retaining the
beneficial effects of the rebuttal) by replacing it with the traditional
avoidable consequences defense to the causation that reliance shows.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1976 the New York Nets had a very gifted basketball player,
Julius "Dr. J" Erving. After including Dr. J in their season ticket advertising, the Nets traded their star. Several season ticket buyers, who
alleged that they bought the tickets to see Dr. J, attempted to bring a
class-action lawsuit for deceit on behalf of all who bought tickets before
the trade. The court refused to certify the class because questions of
individual reliance on the ads predominated over questions common to
the class.' Had the tickets been securities, the fraud-on-the-market theory would have presumed the ticket-buyers' reliance and the class action
would have been certified. Why should reliance differ so radically
between deceit and securities fraud?
This Article compares the two torts that may arise from a misrepresentation. A lie about a financial good (i.e., a security2 ) may give rise to
securities fraud liability, 3 while a lie in a nonfinancial setting may give
rise to liability under the common law tort of deceit, which some jurisi. Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 233, 235-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
2. The terms "security" and "financial good" will be used as synonyms throughout this

article in their economic definition. The legal definition of a security is a much more complex
issue that has reached the Supreme Court at least nine times. See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 165 (2d ed. 1988). For a law-and-economics analysis of the definition of
a security, see William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984).
3. The most famous securities fraud rule is Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994),

issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C.") under the authority of Section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.

15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1988).

Other
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dictions have codified.4 The torts of deceit and securities fraud are very
similar, as is apparent in their shared elements. Both require (1) a
misrepresentation, (2) the appropriate state of mind (scienter, i.e.,
knowledge of falsity and intent to deceive), (3) reliance on the misrepresentation, and (4) injury (5) caused by actions taken in reliance on the
misrepresentation.

The two torts, however, have different standards for

reliance, which have vast ramifications.
Reliance on a misrepresentation for liability in common-law deceit
must be actual and justifiable. By contrast, liability in securities fraud
may arise under presumed reliance according to the fraud-on-the-market

theory, provided the misrepresentation is material.
Reliance is in a state of flux, both in its common law deceit and its
securities fraud incarnations, which makes its analysis important and
particularly timely. The current Congress, in its deregulatory spirit, has
entertained the possibility of eliminating the fraud-on-the-market reli-

ance presumption.6 Conversely, the California Supreme Court recently
refused to extend the fraud-on-the market presumption of reliance to
regulations of securities fraud include SEC Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994), and SEC
Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1994).
Throughout the article, securities fraud will refer to fraud in a nameless transaction on an
organized exchange. Face-to-face transactions are analytically equivalent to the type of
transactions that common law deceit addresses, and securities fraud jurisprudence applies deceitlike rules to them. Therefore, they will not be distinguished from common law deceit. This
article will justify the strictness of securities fraud on the desirability of liquidity and efficiency in
securities markets. The absence of these features from the face-to-face market obviates a
departure from common law.
4. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-100 to -104 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709-1711 (West 1985);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-6-1 to -4 (1992).

5. See, e.g., Loss, supra note 2, at 712 (enumerating knowledge of falsity and justifiability
separately).
The environment of securities markets causes different weight to be given to each of these
elements as they are transferred into the world of securities fraud. Materiality substitutes for
justifiability. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981)
(listing elements of private action in direct and personal transactions as "(1) misstatement or an
omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5) that
proximately caused his injury."); 3 ALAN R. BROMBERO & LEWIs D.

LOWENFELS,

BROMBERG &

LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD 195 (categorizing private action
elements in open market impersonal transactions into misrepresentation and nondisclosure,
materiality, scienter, privity, reliance, causation, and closed transaction). Not listed is the closed
transaction element that Bromberg & Lowenfels admit has many exceptions and "is being whittled
away." Id. at 222.1. The fate of privity is similar. Id. at 206.
6. Section 204 of 104 H.R. 10, The "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995," 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., would have added Section IOA to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The
proposed section, which would define the requirements for maintaining a securities fraud action,
Subsection c read:
(c) Reliance.-In any action arising under section 10(b) based upon a material
misstatement or omission concerning a security, the plaintiff must prove that he or
she had actual knowledge of and actually relied on such statement in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security and that the misstatement or omission
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deceit. 7
Part II of this Article constitutes the heart of its law-and-economics
analysis of the two torts. Taking issue with recent arguments that securities fraud is overprotective of investors,8 Part II argues that the tort
addressing misrepresentations about financial goods must have stronger
deterrence than the tort addressing misrepresentations about real goods.
The fraud-on-the-market presumption increases deterrence because (1)
by making securities fraud class actions easier to certify it increases the
probability that they will be brought, and (2) by increasing the size of
the class it increases the expected damage award. 9
The argument that misrepresentations about financial goods should
be deterred more than those about real goods is based on differences
between the price-formation mechanisms for the two goods. Parts IIA
and IIB introduce the argument by describing these mechanisms. Parts
IIC and IID present the argument's two stages. Part IIC argues that the
danger of false prices due to misrepresentations is greater in financial
markets than in markets for real goods because misrepresentations about
financial goods tend to influence price more, last longer, attract wider
(potentially global) attention, be more frequent, and be more costly to
uncover than misrepresentations about real goods. Part liD then argues
that the danger of financial misrepresentations is socially undesirable.
Contrary to recent assertions,1 ° market participants cannot diversify
against the risk of misrepresentations so as to be indifferent to it. Thereproximately caused (through both transaction causation and loss causation) any loss
incurred by the plaintiff.
The version, which passed over the President's veto, was amended by the Senate, dropping that
clause. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737
(1995).
7. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
8. The lead article favoring relaxation of securities fraud rules while also focusing on fraudon-the-market reliance is Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs And The Law Of Fraud In
ImpersonalMarkets, 78 VA. L. REv. 623 (1992). In a similar spirit are Daniel R. Fischel & David
J. Ross, Should The Law Prohibit "Manipulation" In FinancialMarkets?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 503
(1991); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons From Economics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REv. 1017
(1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud-On-The-MarketTheory Revisited, 77
VA. L. REv. 1001 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990);
Richard A. Posner, Law and the Theory ofFinance: Some Intersections, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
159 (1986).
9. Securities fraud is easier for the plaintiff to prove for other reasons as well. An example
is the evidentiary standard. Securities fraud must be proved only by a preponderance of the
evidence, while deceit must be shown with clear and convincing evidence. See Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1983).
10. See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 639 ("Moreover, the losses associated with lies issuers tell
to secondary-market participants are diversifiable risks from the latter's viewpoint. Investors who
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fore, market participants react to this risk in a socially undesirable way.
Those market participants who trade motivated by information
("informed traders") react to the risk of tainted information by being less
willing to trade. Since the trades of informed traders correct prices, their
reduction is tantamount to a reduction in market efficiency. Those market participants who trade in response to saving and consumption needs
("uninformed traders") have incentives to avoid trading or to become
informed (both of which reduce market liquidity), and to require greater
return from their investments (which increases the cost of capital).
Thus, the fear of securities fraud undermines the service of capital markets, both in the optimal allocation of capital and in the provision of
low-cost capital to firms.
Part III applies the preceding analysis to the rules of securities
fraud. Part IIIA reminds us that reliance in a deceit action is, in fact, a
test of causation: whether the deceived party's actions were caused by
the misrepresentation. Part IIIB contends that the fraud-on-the-market
reliance presumption is just an adaptation of the same causation-testing
to a new environment. Causation has changed in modem securities markets; injury can be caused without actual reliance. Part IIIB also argues
that the presumption of reliance has not yet completely adapted to its
new surroundings. While uninformed long-term investors are adequately protected against fraud, informed speculators are inexplicably
exposed to it. Informed traders have no recourse because if they invoke
the presumption of reliance, it may be rebutted due to their failure to
trust the integrity of the market." But this does not simply imply that
the rebuttal for distrusting the market should be eliminated, since distrust may signal lack of causation. The simpler traditional concept of
avoidable consequences would allow, however, the accurate assessment
of which informed traders' injuries were caused by the misrepresentation, and which were the traders' own fault. This improvement would
be crucial, because it would restore the incentive for informed trading.
The current presumption undermines the potential contribution of
informed traders to accurate pricing by the market. Thus, the conclusion
of this analysis is that fraud-on-the-market is a desirable but incomplete
development in securities fraud.

hold the market portfolio and trade only in response to changes in their income and consumption
levels are as likely to make trading gains as trading losses from secondary-market fraud.").
11. Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding an informed

trader, short-seller, could not use the presumption of reliance because, while the presumption's
premise is market efficiency, the short seller believed that the market price overestimated the

stock's true value; therefore, he did not trust in the integrity of the market).
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COMPARING THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF DECEIT TO THAT OF
SECURITIES FRAUD

This Part focuses on the economic rationale for the two torts, deceit
and securities fraud. Their justification is founded on how prices are
formed in the underlying markets, markets for real goods in the case of
deceit and markets for financial goods in the case of securities fraud.
Sections A and B review how prices are formed in each respective market. Each buyer of a real good may place a different subjective value on
it. Regardless of each market participant's subjective valuation of the
real good, the market-clearing price equals the valuation of only the last
(or marginal) buyer and seller. 2 Financial goods, by contrast, are valued equally by all buyers and sellers, but this valuation is uncertain
because it is based on expected future performances. Conventional lawand-economics analysis argues that rules attaching liability to misrepresentations are desirable because they prevent wasteful verification of
information by market participants.13
In order to examine whether preventing verification is more desirable in financial markets, Section C compares the influence of misrepresentations in real and financial goods. The price of real goods tends to
be influenced for a shorter time and by a smaller amount than the price
of financial goods. Moreover, misrepresentations about real goods tend
to be less frequent, more costly to verify, and noticed locally instead of
globally. Consequently, stricter measures against fraud are dictated in
financial markets. Section D addresses the counter-argument that fraud
in financial markets does not matter. Market efficiency depends on
informed trading that cannot be diversified. The fear of fraud also influences uninformed traders, whose trading may be diversified, but not so
as to eliminate the risk of fraud. Their aversion to fraud-induced losses
becomes an aversion to trading. Thus, the reaction to fraud is akin to the
reaction to a transaction cost, which provides incentives to trade less
frequently, with more information, and for higher returns. The result is
less efficient and less liquid markets, and a higher cost of capital for
corporations.
12. The marginal buyer and seller are the very last buyer and seller, the ones who are
indifferent about whether they enter into the transaction. In other words, the marginal buyer
would not buy if the price were any higher and the marginal seller would not sell if the price were
any lower.
13. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) (tort liability

prevents wasteful precaution efforts); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in
Securities FraudCases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 16 (1982) (arguing
that an important function of the presumption of reliance is to prevent costly precautions by

investors who cannot meet the standard reliance test).
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A.

Real Goods' Price Formation: Marginal Pricingwith
Subjective Valuation

Real goods are such because their buyers put them to real use.

Cars, chairs and washing machines are not used to preserve savings. In
contrast to stocks, bonds, and bank deposits, which are held in order to
be liquidated, real goods are owned for their own sake. Buyers of real
goods decide whether to buy them based on how much utility they will

derive from the goods. Buyers of financial goods decide whether to buy
them based on the funds they expect the goods to return in the future.
The characterization of any single good as a financial or real good is
14
rarely clear, but this does not interfere with the analysis.
14. Goods routinely have both financial and real features, offering to their owners wealthstorage as well as direct enjoyment. Consequently, prices of durable real goods may be influenced
by their expected resale values. For example, car advertisements stressing resale values show that
car manufacturers think that their clientele find cars more desirable if they have higher resale
values. Thus, cars sold for personal use may take on characteristics of financial goods.
Similarly, financial goods may offer their owners real enjoyment: A controlling block of a
corporation's shares, for example, comes with the prestige of the chairman of the board, a comer
office, an executive secretary and a limousine. Even debtholders may get the real good of control
through a bankruptcy reorganization. The legal environment, sensitive to this change of character,
did not consider controlling blocks of shares securities for the purpose of the Securities Acts. See,
e.g., Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1983) (81% block not a security); Sutter v.
Groen, 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (presumption that sale of 50% block does not involve a
security); Oakhill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. I11.
1981) (sale of 50% block did not involve a security). This interpretation was reversed by the
Supreme Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
While real and financial characteristics often coexist in a good and its pricing mechanism
consequently is not purely either of the two described here, we need to assume a purely real and
purely financial good to observe the theoretical markets. The character, be it real or financial, that
dominates in each good will determine which is the dominant market mechanism for it. When
extraordinary circumstances change the good's character, the pricing mechanism will change as
well.
The severe rules of securities fraud, which this article supports based on the pricing
mechanism of financial goods, may be excessive for real goods. But this does not create problems
for the infrequent and temporary instances when financial goods take on real goods'
characteristics (as they may, for example, during a fight for corporate control or in a bankruptcy
proceeding). Neither commentators nor the law have ignored this occurrence. Professor Lucian
Bebchuck, for example, builds a model analyzing the transfers of control based on the "private
benefits of control," i.e., the utility the controller gets from the financial good. Lucian A.
Bebchuck, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, Q.J. EcoN. 957 (Nov. 1994).
Such events are also addressed by special rules, such as the prohibition on the sale of corporate
office, e.g., Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1975), or the liability for sellers of corporate
control to looters. See, e.g., Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978); Harris v. Carter,
582 A.2d 222 (Del. Ch. 1990).
On the other hand, the insufficient severity of common law deceit has been recognized
regarding some real goods. For example, typical "lemon laws" change deceit rules if the object of
the transaction is a car. See Heather Newton, When Life Gives You Lemons, Make A Lemon Law:
North CarolinaAdopts Automobile WarrantyLegislation, 66 N.C.L. REv. 1080 (1988); Jeffrey L.
Reed, Comment, The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act: An Overview, 58 TENN. L. REV. 455
(1991).
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Furthermore, the pricing of real goods is different because they are
subject to the law of diminishing returns, while financial goods are not.
Family cars, milk and chairs are prime examples of goods that are more
desirable in small quantities. The tenth car in the driveway, the twentieth gallon of milk in the refrigerator and the hundredth chair in the living room are superfluous, even burdensome, and clearly less desirable
15
than the first unit of each.
Let us study the interaction of these typical market participants in
16
an example of a purely real good.
Example of Price-Formationin Real Goods: A real good has nine
potential buyers and nine potentialsellers. Buyer one receives $1 of use
from one unit of the good, buyer two receives $2, and so on. A second
unit is of negligible use to any buyer (which is an extreme manifestation
of diminishing returns). Seller one produces a single unit of the good
for a cost of $1, seller two for $2, and so on. The cost of producing a
second unit is extraordinaryfor all sellers (again, we see diminishing
returns). In this market,five units of the good would be produced. Buyers nine through five would buy the units sold by sellers one through
five. The market-clearingpricefor the good is $5. In a graphic representation of this market, the supply and the demand curves show how
many goods would be bought or sold at each price. For example, the
demand line in the following figure starts at the point which corresponds to a quantity of one at a price of $9. This graphicrepresentation
illustrates that if the price were $9 then there would be a demand for
only one unit of the good, thatfrom Buyer nine. The market "clears" at
the price where the number of goods bought is equal to the number sold.

15. See, e.g., RICHARD H. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 30518 (5th ed. 1973).
16. The analysis that will be used, the simple downward-sloping demand and upward-sloping
supply curve, is the simplest core concept of microeconomic theory. For a more technical
discussion, see, e.g., DAVID M. KREps, A COURSE INMICROECONOMIC THEORY 263-267 (1990).
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THE SUPPLY/DEMAND

PRICING MECHANISM FOR REAL GOODS
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Figure 1: A graphic representation of the pricing mechanism that applies to real goods.

The supply and the demand curves depict the number of units of goods that would be bought or
sold at each price. The market "clears" at the price that allows all goods that are offered for sale
to be bought (here at a price of $5). The numbers correspond to the example in the text.

The point of the example is that each market participant may place
a purely subjective value on the good different from its price, while the
market price coincides with the valuations of the "marginal" buyer and
seller. Those who value the good higher than its market price cannot
gain by buying more because the law of diminishing returns ensures that
additional units will be worth less to them than the market price. The
same applies for the sellers; they cannot profitably produce additional
units.
B. FinancialGoods' Price Formation: Uncertain But Objective
Valuation and Pricing
The fact that all financial goods perform the same function, carrying wealth through time, makes them equally valuable to all buyers and
sellers. The only distinguishing features between financial goods are the
return that each promises (i.e., price appreciation plus distributions such
as dividends or interest) and the risk at which each exposes its owners'
capital. Financial goods that offer the same return at the same risk are
fungible. Furthermore, since each unit of a financial good performs, the
same function, financial goods are not subject to the law of diminishing
returns.
The most widely accepted economic theory describing the pricing
mechanism of financial goods is the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Its principal author, Professor William Sharpe, received the
Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics in 1990 together with Professor
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Harry Markowitz, author of the Modem Portfolio Theory. 1 7
The Modem Portfolio Theory laid the foundation for the CAPM by
separating the risk of securities into two categories. Only one matters to
typical investors. The theory attributes the volatility of securities' prices
either to circumstances unique to the issuing corporation or to circumstances associated with the overall economy. The Modem Portfolio
Theory explains that the former "unsystematic" risk can disappear with
diversification. The holder of the hypothetical War Company, which
will perform poorly in peace, does not fear peace if she also holds Peace
Company. Peace Company's success in peace will cancel out War
Company's poor performance. The holder of this diversified portfolio is
indifferent to war or peace.
Investors cannot diversify against fluctuations caused by economic
conditions, since they will influence all securities in the same way. The
sensitivity of each security to the performance of the economy is
undiversifiable, systematic risk. This sensitivity is measured statistically
by the "beta" coefficient, which compares changes in the security's
returns to the returns of a market index. If the security's returns change
on average as much as the market's, then their correlation is perfect and
the security will have a beta of 1. If the security moves half as much as
the economy, its beta is .5, if it moves twice as much its beta is 2.
Based on these Modem Portfolio Theory conclusions, the CAPM
explained that since investors are only sensitive to the systematic risk of
each security, securities with equal betas should offer equal returns. If
securities deviate from the price that offers equal returns, then a profitable trading strategy (an arbitrage 18 opportunity) arises. For example, if
the security's price were too high for its beta, one could sell it and with
the proceeds buy a mixture of (a) risk-free debt or credit which by definition has zero beta; and (b) the market index. The mix of the market
index and the debt must have the same beta as the security sold.' 9 Since
the security and the mixture have the same beta they have equal
17. A most readable introductory collection of materials appears in RONALD GILSON &
(2d ed. 1995); see
also Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 3-5 (1982).
BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 81-134

18. An arbitrage transaction involves buying and selling two nearly identical goods or
securities. Arbitrageurs sell the overvalued one and buy the undervalued one. When the undervaluation or overvaluation has passed, the arbitrageurs reap their profits by selling the good or
security they bought and buying back the good or security they sold. The ingenuity of this double
transaction is that the arbitrageurs are indifferent to changes in the value of the good or security.
Since they have both bought and sold it, they have no position on it. Changes in its value do not
influence arbitrageurs' wealth. Arbitrageurs only have a stake in the relative change in value
between the good they bought and the one they sold.
19. If the sold security has a beta of.5, that would correspond to a portfolio of 50% index and
50% risk-free debt. Securities issued by the government are considered risk-free because of the
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expected returns. The arbitrageur has only to wait for the mispricing to
disappear and then cash her profits. Empirical evidence has verified the
proposition that securities are priced according to their beta. z°
The supply and demand pricing mechanism does not disappear with
financial goods. However, the assumption of costless arbitrage and the
disappearance of diminishing returns change the picture dramatically.
Supply and demand curves are horizontal. Any decrease in price results
in unlimited buying; any increase results in unlimited selling. The next
figure depicts the supply and demand interpretation of the CAPM.
THE HORIZONTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF THE

CAPM

Price
Supply

Po

Demand

0

Quantity

+00

Figure2: The graphic representation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. According to the
CAPM, everyone values the securities equally, the value P.. Any price above P. leads to infinite
selling, as indicated by the horizontal supply curve showing supply going to infinity at prices
above P.. Any price below P, leads to infinite demand.

Having briefly described the theoretical foundations of the two
markets in which common law deceit and securities fraud operate, we
must now compare the effects of misrepresentations in those markets.
Since the purpose of the two torts is to eliminate wasteful verification,
we will first examine how verification incentives are different in the two
markets. After Section C shows how this incentive is stronger in financial markets, Section D will argue that the heightened concern about
wasteful verification in financial markets is appropriate and justifies the
more severe rule of presumed reliance in securities fraud.
government's capacity to print money and satisfy its obligations. This ignores inflation risk, but is
the closest thing to risk-free debt.
20. See Eugene F. Fama & James D. MacBeth, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical
Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973). Their results are reproduced, along with a description of the
CAPM, in RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 162
(3d ed. 1988).
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C. Differences in the Incentive to Verify
It is intuitive that misrepresentations have an adverse impact on
participants in both real and financial markets. We will examine the
effect of those misrepresentations in the context of the simple examples

we have already set up.
Example of a Misrepresentation About a Real Good. Start by
introducing a misrepresentationinto the 9-buyer/seller example used to
illustrate the pricing mechanism of real goods. A lie reaches two poten-

tial buyers and changes their beliefs about the good's usefulness. Suppose buyers one and two, who would have bought a unit at $1 and $2,
respectively, are now persuaded to buy the units at any price up to $8.21
Now four units are demanded at $8, two by buyers one and two (the
victims of the misrepresentation) and two by buyers eight and nine
(buyer nine would actually pay up to $9). A fifth unit is demanded at $7,
a sixth at $6 and a seventh at $5. Notice that the misrepresentation

shifts the demand curve to the right by two units. While without the
misrepresentationthis market cleared at a price of $5, after the misrepresentation it clears at a price of $6.

21. This example is distinguishable from Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d
233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), where the Nets advertised Erving as a member of the team and then
traded him. The misrepresentation there, "come see Erving play for the Nets," may imply higher
utility for some basketball fans and lower utility for others, such as the fans of the Nets'
opponents. Thus, the misrepresentation may not influence prices even though it may result in the
tickets' highest valuing users not buying them.
The Nets example is more complex than the one in the text, but it underlines one more
difference between real and financial goods. The complexity is that the single statement of the
Nets has two different results, one on Nets' fans and one on their opponents' fans. Once the two
effects are separated, the analysis is analogous to the one in the text.
The different ways that the same piece of information subjectively influences the goods'
desirability is a characteristic of real goods that Strauss brings to focus. The only relevant
statements about financial goods concern their risk and future returns. Two investors who agree
on the meaning of a statement cannot then value the asset differently. If the statement implies
higher returns or lower risk, it makes the asset more desirable for every investor.
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MISREPRESENTATION ABOUT A REAL GOOD
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Figure 3: This is the graphic representation of a misrepresentation's interference with the
typical market for real goods. Before the misrepresentation takes place, the "Demand-before" and
"Supply" curves determine the price and quantity of the goods produced. According to the example above, five units are produced and they sell for $5 each. The effect of the misrepresentation is
to change the subjective valuation of the good by two buyers, the one who would buy one unit at
$2 and the one who would buy one at $1. These buyers' contribution to the "Demand-before"
curve is marked by A, indicating the eighth and ninth units demanded. The misrepresentation,
however, persuades these buyers that the good is worth $8, making them demand the third and
fourth units at that price. This contribution to the demand curve after the misrepresentation is
marked by B. The result is a shift to the right of the demand curve and a higher market-clearing
price.

This misrepresentation has two striking features. First, it influenced buyer one's decision because buyer one would not have bought
the good otherwise. If the misrepresentation had reached buyers nine

through five it would have had no impact. Second, the size of the misrepresentation is much larger than its effect on price. It changed buyer
two's valuation of the good from $2 to $8, a $6 change, while the price
changed only $1. But there are more differences between the effects of a
misrepresentation on real and financial markets.

Determining the effect of a misrepresentation about a financial
good in terms of the supply and demand curve, using the CAPM, is
elusive. The trading of those who believe the misrepresentation will
form horizontal supply and demand curves at the price indicated by the

misrepresentation (PM). Those who do not believe it will form horizontal supply and demand curves at the original price (Po). At any price
between the two, the group that believes the misrepresentation would

engage in unlimited buying and the group that does not believe in it
would engage in unlimited selling. Neither the CAPM nor supply and
demand curves offer any insight as to what the price would be in such a
market.
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ABOUT A FINANCIAL GOOD

Price
PM

Supply
Demand

PO

Supply
Demand

0

Quantity

Figure 4: Trying to graphically illustrate the implications of a misrepresentation in terms
of the CAPM does not result in an equilibrium. Those who do not believe the misrepresentation
continue to consider the financial good worth its old price, Po. Those who believe it consider the
good worth its misrepresented value, PM. But the CAPM would have all the former buying infinite quantities and the latter selling infinite quantities at any price between Po and PM. This
disequilibrium is resolved by Market Microstructure, which explains the limits on trading activity
among market participants with different valuations.

The inability of traditional economic methods to deal with heterogeneously informed traders in financial markets spurred the creation of a
new method in economics, a method that focuses in even more detail
than microeconomics on the interaction between market participants. It
is known as Market Microstructure and its disciples use game-theoretical methods. The quest is not for the equilibrium price, but for the equilibrium strategy: the strategy that each trader will follow to break even.
Once such a strategy is devised, every participant must react to the
others' strategies and break even without giving other investors grounds
to improve their strategies. Every strategy is the best response to every
other one.
The problem of heterogeneously informed traders has been the
object of Professor Sanford Grossman's work. His analysis, set out in
his seminal book The InformationalRole of Prices,2 2 brings together the
CAPM, heterogeneous information, and risk-aversion models. Grossman shows that the risk-aversion of informed traders precludes them
from following the CAPM's strategy of unlimited buying and selling
even if they have different valuations. Professors Anat Admati and Paul
Pfleiderer bring into the analysis the competition among informed traders and the liquidity that uninformed trading generates.2 3 They explain
22. SANFORD GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES (1989).
23. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price
Variability, 1 REv. FIN. STUD. 3 (1988). In attempting to explain why trading volume clusters at
certain hours of the day, Admati and Pfleiderer start with the proposition that once a time period

I
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that the trading of the uninformed creates liquidity that attracts informed
traders, who can derive greater profits in greater liquidity. But increased
participation of the informed results in stronger competition for trading
profits and trading that is more aggressive, which leads to faster correction of prices. Professor Albert Kyle brings time pressure into the analysis, and posits that even insiders will cause prices to reflect their inside
information if there is a time after which they cannot trade.2 4
To summarize the two decades of work that followed the CAPM in
one sentence, (a) risk-aversion of informed traders reduces their impact
on price, (b) the market's liquidity increases the number of informed
traders and intensifies their competition, thereby increasing their impact
on price, and (c) time pressure (such as an impending public announcement of their information) increases their impact.
Market microstructure suggests that the market will react to misrephas higher trading volume, it also offers traders greater liquidity. The liquidity attracts both
informed and uninformed traders. The informed will turn their information into higher profits by
placing larger trades. The uninformed will be able to trade with a less adverse price reaction. The
conclusion is that the uninformed prefer the trading period in which the informed cluster despite
the greater overall profits of the informed. The reason is that the increased participation of the
informed increases competition among them, which erodes their profits and causes prices to
correct faster. This implies that liquidity increases efficiency. The result is that, although profits
of the informed are higher, their increase is less than the increase in uninformed trading.
Therefore, the losses of the uninformed traders to the informed are reduced when measured per
transaction. The conclusions of Admati and Pfleiderer are validated empirically by Michael J.
Barclay et al., Private Information, Trading Volume, and Stock-Return Variances, 3 REV. FIN.
STUD. 233 (1990). The article compares weekends where the Tokyo Stock Exchange was open on
Saturdays with weekends where it was closed. The alternative hypothesis to the Admati and
Pfleiderer model, trading noise, was refuted both because the weekly variance did not increase in
the longer weeks and because American stocks did not have increased variance if traded in Tokyo
on weekends. The fact that stocks listed in multiple exchanges have low volume and return
variance on their secondary exchanges helps prove the theory that all traders will congregate on
markets of great liquidity. Volume is concentrated in the more liquid parent exchange where the
stock is principally traded. Informed traders also avoid foreign exchanges, resulting in a slowing
of price adjustments to new information, thereby lowering efficiency. Although these
observations do not verify the principle that decreased efficiency of foreign markets is due to
reduced uninformed trading, they do correlate efficiency with volume and liquidity.
24. Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315
(1985). My interpretation of Kyle's work as showing that time pressure ferrets out information
from informed traders may be unconventional. Kyle's article claims to show that insider trading
is not undesirable because prices will be corrected by the insider by the end of trading. A
permanent end to trading, however, is a rare event in the stock market, only exhibited in delistings. If we accept that public announcement of the information also eliminates further profits
by insiders, then announcements may equal Kyle's end of trading. I have countered Kyle's
conclusion regarding insider trading regulation by arguing that the relevant measure to decide
whether to prohibit insider trading is the aggregate profits of informed traders. Prohibiting insider
trading may reduce costs, leading to greater market liquidity at the cost of little reduction in
efficiency. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market
MicrostructureJustification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 1
(1993).
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resentations. Only a fraction of informed traders need to believe it for
them to face significant competition and trade aggressively. Only some
risk aversion by nonbelieving informed traders is enough to keep them
from completely resisting the new price movement. Only some time
pressure for the informed traders who believe the misrepresentation to
rush to take advantage of it. But while it appears unlikely that the disbelievers will completely quash the believers' effect on price, the liquidity
of each security determines the likely number of informed traders. The
greater the liquidity, the larger their number and the more likely that just
persuading a fraction of them will create competitive pressure.
Notice that the courts applying the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance have been sensitive to similar concerns. If the market is
not liquid (and, hence, not efficient), courts have refused to apply the
presumption.2 5 On the other hand, if informed traders are persuaded that
the misrepresentation is not true, the presumption of reliance may be
rebutted.26
The analysis of the effect of a misrepresentation in the markets for
real and financial goods lays the foundation for their comparison.
Stricter securities fraud rules would be justified if the securities markets
created stronger verification incentives (provided that verification incentives are as undesirable in financial markets as in real markets). The
next paragraphs argue that misrepresentations in financial markets tend
to create stronger verification incentives than misrepresentations in real
markets. The issue of the undesirability of fraud in financial markets is
the object of Part liD.
False statements in markets for real goods are less detrimental than
in markets for financial goods for the following reasons: (1) False
statements influence the price of real goods for a shorter time, only
when their recipients participate in the market. The prices of financial
goods are influenced continuously until the false statements are corrected. (2) The influence of false statements on the price of real goods
will be smaller than the change in value that the misrepresentation
implies. There are few safeguards to prevent the price of financial
25. See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
the market for municipal bonds not efficient enough for statements to be reflected in price, so the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance is rebutted).
26. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied sub nom. Gollomp v. Trump, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994) (concluding other cautionary

statements in offering sufficiently warned investors of risk so that no liability arose for some
omissions); Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1420 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding
inaccurate statements by Land's End of its performance did not create liability when the market
knew the actual results); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied sub nom. Schneider v. Apple Computer, Inc., 496 U.S. 943 (1990) (despite Apple's

misrepresentations, the press had credibly informed investors about the failure of new products).
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goods from reflecting the entire change in value that the misrepresentation suggests. (3) The misrepresentation's influence on a real good is
usually local and draws only local attention and verification efforts,
while financial misrepresentations receive global attention and verification attempts. (4) Misrepresentations about financial goods should be
expected to be more frequent than misrepresentations about real goods.
(5) Verification costs are smaller in the case of real goods.
1.

THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF DECEIT'S INTERFERENCE WITH REAL
GOODS' PRICES

The false prices that misrepresentations create in real goods are corrected as soon as the deceived participants leave the market. The reason
lies in the way they influence prices. The deceived party influences
price through his contribution to demand or supply. As soon as the
deceived party leaves, the price should return to its uninfluenced level.
By contrast, financial goods' prices change by the information itself,
meaning that once prices are influenced, more than the simple absence
of the deceived party is necessary for price correction.
According to economic theory, the price of real goods is associated
with the concept of clearing of the market. Prices will have to be set so
that everyone who would buy or sell at that price has done so.27 Clear-

ing, however, is not well defined in practical terms. For instance, does
the market for groceries clear every evening when the grocery store
closes, or after every transaction when a customer walks away? Or does
the market clear only when the season's produce is sold out? To the
extent these questions can be answered, the answers will have caveats
connecting each time period with the next: The grocer refuses to lower
prices to sell more to the current customer because she knows she can
sell at higher prices to subsequent customers. The grocer also feels little
pressure to lower prices to sell all her produce before the end of the day.
She knows that at little cost she can store the produce and sell it the next
day. Even at the end of the season, for a low-enough price, produce will
be frozen. Prices will not drop below that level.
To see how the influence of deceit depends on the presence of the
deceived party in the market, imagine a good that is too costly to carry
across time the way the grocer did. Markets must clear independently at
the end of each period. Imagine, also, that the good bought is useful for
27. Those who have not bought or sold have not done so because the price is too high to buy
or too low to produce and sell. This supply/demand analysis is frequently used in economics

textbooks to show that price regulation causes the market not to clear, in which case excess supply
or demand exists. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 62-64 (3d ed. 1985); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
393-94 (12th ed. 1985).
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three periods, while three periods are also necessary for its production.
A buyer of this good is likely not to return to the market for two periods
after a purchase. Deceiving one buyer may influence price in the current
period, but it will not influence prices in the following two. Consider
the earlier example of nine buyers and sellers. The shift in the demand
curve only occurs in the period when the deceived buyers participate in
the market.
Example of Failure to Equalize Prices due to Costly Carrying:
Consider a good which lasts for three periods and assume the supply
and demand of the good in each period is identical to that of the nine
buyers and sellers example, above. If two buyers have been deceived in
period one, we now assume they will return in periodsfour, seven, and
so on. The result is a price of $6 in period one with the misrepresentation, while the price was $5 before.
Assume that carryingthe goodfrom one period to the next costs $2
per unit. Since the price in the periods affected by deceit will be $6, and
will be $5 at other times, carrying is not profitable and will not occur.
Therefore, the price differential acrossperiods will persist. The price in
periods two and three will be $5, while duringperiodfour it will return
to $6.
The example illustrates the temporary influence of deceit on prices.
Its temporary nature, however, is limited by the degree of separation
between periods, that is, the cost of carrying goods to subsequent periods. The speed with which the deceived party discovers the truth may
also reduce the duration of deceit's influence on prices. If I am told that
an elixir will increase my strength within a month, the falsity of this
statement will be obvious one month later. My disillusionment will
eliminate my contribution to the shift in the demand curve.
Neither of these two effects are present in the securities markets.
Not only does carrying securities across trading periods have negligible
cost (since securities need no costly storage), but frequently the listener
is not able to establish a statement's truth or falsity.28 It is impossible to
28. The problem is most acute for "forward-looking" information about a firm's future
prospects, the most important type of information for determining the price of its securities.
Information about the firm's past performance is practically irrelevant for its valuation.

Investments are made for future returns. Information about future performance determines the
price at which investments are desirable. The uncertainty associated with estimating future
performance effectively prohibits management from predicting the firm's performance. Any such
prediction runs the risk of securities fraud liability. Given this problem, and acknowledging that
forward-looking information is most important for accurate pricing, the SEC has tried to
encourage predictions by shielding them from liability in several ways, and more such efforts are
part of the current congressional litigation reform effort. For example, SEC Rule 175, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.175 (1994) provides a safe harbor for forward-looking statements by immunizing their
makers from liability if they are in good faith. See Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities
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distinguish an accurately priced security from an erroneously priced
security. The accuracy of the price depends on the accurate calculation
of the probability with which each different future price will materialize.
Even after the fact, however, one cannot know whether the probabilities
were right. The outcome that materialized is irrelevant information with
regard to the probability that this outcome would materialize, which is
the information that matters for accurate pricing.
Example of the Indistinguishability between Accurately Priced
Securities Realizing Unexpectedly Good Results and Underpriced
Securities: XYZ Corporationstates that it will be worth $100 per share
next year, with an 80% probability. In the unlikely event that a research
project develops favorably-a 10% probability-it will be worth $150
per share. In the unlikely event that XYZ incurs an environmentalliability, also a 10% probability, it will be worth $50 per share. If these
statements are correct, the risk-neutral valuation of XYZ is the present
value of $100 in one year. A year goes by and the price is at $150. This
information is irrelevant to the accuracy of the probability estimates in
last year's statement.
This inherent unverifiability of statements about financial goods
aggravates the permanent effect of financial misrepresentations. If
reexamining past statements' accuracy tends to be a vain pursuit, then
market participants may fail to discover the falsity of some falsifiable
misrepresentations.
In sum, misrepresentations about real goods should influence their
prices for a shorter time than misrepresentations about financial goods
for two reasons: the influence on prices depends on the deceived party's
presence in the market and the statement's truth is usually ascertainable
quickly.
2.

THE SMALL PRICE IMPACT OF DECEIT COMPARED TO
SECURITIES FRAUD

We saw in the example illustrating the movement of the demand
curve caused by a lie, that the price of real goods did not change as
much as the change in value implied by a deceptive statement. There
Act, Release No. 6084 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. CCCH)

82117 (June 25, 1979).

The treatment of appraisals is analogous. Appraisals are uncertain because they concern assets
that have not yet been liquidated. As with predictions, professionals are afraid to make appraisals
for fear of incurring liability. The SEC has reduced the likelihood that appraisals made in good
faith will give rise to liability by removing them from the note to SEC Rule 14a-9, which listed
them as examples of misleading statements. See also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules,
Exchange Act, Release No. 5276 [1956 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

76,380 (Jan.

17, 1956). The commission's efforts, however, do not solve the problem of investors trying to
verify the valuation of securities.
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are two reasons for the small effect of misrepresentations on the prices
of real goods. First, a misrepresentation rarely influences all potential
buyers. Therefore the demand curve shifts less than the effect of the
misrepresentation. Furthermore, the rise in prices will usually induce
an increase in supply, which would mitigate the effect of the
misrepresentation.
President Abraham Lincoln explained, in lay terms, why only a partial movement of the demand curve is likely in response to a misrepresentation: "you can't fool all the people all of the time."29 A
misrepresentation usually will not influence all potential buyers of a
good. Indeed, it is hard to specify what we mean by a complete shift of
the demand curve. If a misrepresentation persuades all buyers that the
goods are worth $7, its effect on the demand curve of our example of
nine buyers and sellers is not a parallel shift but a rotation: the curve
will pivot counterclockwise to become horizontal at the $7 level. A parallel shift is envisioned in an unlikely case: a misrepresentation that the
good performs a valuable function in addition to the ones it already performs, and that this additional function is worth $2 to each buyer. Only
then will each buyer value the good at $2 more than before the misrepresentation, with the effect of a parallel shift up of the demand curve by
$2.
Securities markets provide the opposite environment, one in which
local and national borders are crossed at little, if any, cost, one in which
securities can be held for the long term at no cost. The profound inter3
nationalization of securities markets is proof of this lack of borders. 1
The additional fact that a central clearing corporation holds all securities
in most exchanges eliminates any storage cost. 3 ' Another fundamental
difference between securities and real goods, the lack of diminishing
returns, dramatically influences the capacity of small, misinformed
groups of buyers or sellers to influence prices. Since buying more units
of the financial good, i.e., more shares, does not make additional ones
any less desirable, even small groups who think a security is undervalued have an incentive to buy as much of it as they can and exert great
buying pressure on prices. This stands in stark contrast to the situation
29. Lincoln to a Caller at the White House, from Alexander K. McClure, Lincoln's Yams and
Stories, in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 457 (Christopher Marley ed., 11th ed. 1946).
30. See, e.g., Richard P. Bernard, InternationalLinkages Between Securities Markets: "A
Ring of Dinosaurs Joining Hands and Dancing Together"?, 1987 COLIM. Bus. L. REV. 321
(discussing ways in which the internationalization of securities trading is already implementedmost notably through American brokerage clients' ability to trade many non-U.S. stocks in U.S.
exchanges through American Depository Receipts-and barriers to further unification).
31. See, e.g., Egon Guttman, FederalRegulation of Transfer Agents, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 281
(1985). The regulation of clearing houses and transfer agents is controlled by Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 17A, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1 (1994) and the SEC rules promulgated thereunder.
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with real goods, where each buyer can use only a limited amount of the
good due to diminishing returns; and therefore, exerts limited pressure
on prices. Even if many potential buyers were convinced that a real
good was worth more than its price, each would buy only a few units.
Even when all buyers of the real good are persuaded by the misrepresentation and the demand curve shifts by the entire amount of the misrepresentation, prices will rarely change as much. The reason lies in the
production increase that usually follows a price increase. This increase
in production will usually depress prices to counter the inflationary
effect of the misrepresentation. Thus, the increased supply mitigates the
full effect of the misrepresentation on demand.
In economic theory, this point is illustrated by the upward (positive) slope of the supply curve. It represents that an increase in prices
leads to an increase in the quantity supplied. The downward (negative)
slope of the demand curve shows that prices fall in response to more
supply. Therefore, the mitigating effect of supply increases depends on
the slope of the supply and the demand curves.3 2 It is a special case
when a horizontal supply curve meets a horizontal demand curve. This
phenomenon is practically unique to the securities markets.
By contrast, financial goods are not subject to sloping supply or
demand curves. 33 A misrepresentation may impact price fully if its disbelievers are too few, or too risk averse.34
3.

LOCAL VERSUS UNIVERSAL ATTENTION TO MISREPRESENTATIONS

An additional difference between markets for real and financial
goods is their size. Financial markets are international, whereas markets
for real goods are usually local. A misrepresentation by a Connecticut
32. A more horizontal supply curve would lead to a smaller price change in response to the
movement of the demand curve (provided it slopes down). A horizontal supply curve means
sellers have unlimited production ability at the current price. At the opposite extreme, a more
vertical supply curve would fully translate any movement of the demand curve to a change in
prices. A vertical supply curve means producers are unable to increase production in the face of

higher prices.
33. Recently, legal and economic scholars have argued that the premise of horizontal supply
and demand curves for financial goods may not hold. The evidence offered to support sloping
demand curves is the premium that is offered for takeovers or the premium that must be paid to
trade large blocks of stock as compared to small blocks. See Andrei Schleifer, Do Demand
Curvesfor Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FrN. 579, 579 (1986). This is different from arguing that the
sloping curves do not apply at all to financial goods. Takeovers involve financial goods that

temporarily take on characteristics of real goods. In a takeover, the buyer does not look for an
investment opportunity but for the business itself. The buyer is looking for control, not return.
The premium that is paid by block traders is also distinguishable. In this case, price changes only
for the immediate term. Block traders pay a premium in order to trade immediately. Because they

are in a hurry they cannot break up their order into small trades. That implies they have
information that must be offset by a price advantage for other market participants.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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snowblower manufacturer with stock traded on the New York Stock
Exchange is as relevant in California or Germany as it is in Connecticut.
German and American investors are equally interested in the firm's valuation because they can all trade shares in the corporation at equal cost.
By contrast, a misrepresentation about an impending snowstorm will
only influence the demand, and price, of snow-removal equipment in the
affected area.
The source of the difference, again, is carrying costs. Real goods
must be moved to the place where they will perform their service and
this carrying cost is significant. Financial goods, by contrast, are traded
in organized transfer and clearing systems, which eliminate the need to
physically deliver the certificates underlying the securities. 35 When an
investor buys a security, regardless of his location, a simple entry in the
books of the clearing corporation will transfer ownership of the security.
Contrast this to the purchaser of snow-removal equipment. The purchaser must pay to transport the equipment before he can benefit from
its ownership. A misrepresentation about a snowstorm may increase
demand for snowblowers in Hartford, allowing dealers to maximize
profits, but Boston and Albany snowblower dealers cannot step in without cost to satisfy the unexpected demand. They must absorb the cost of
moving their inventory before selling it. They will not carry their snowblowers to Hartford unless the Hartford price is higher than their local
price plus carrying costs. If additional snowblowers arrive in Hartford,
they will alleviate the effect of the misrepresentation by increasing supply and decreasing prices. The carrying cost sets how close prices in
Hartford can be to Boston and Albany prices. The difference in snowblower prices between Hartford and the other markets cannot be profitably reduced below the carrying cost.
The global reach of financial misrepresentations means that the
incentive to avoid them is global. All investors want to know the truth
about the security they buy. By contrast, a snowblower buyer in Colorado is indifferent to misrepresentations that influence snowblower
prices in the northeastern United States, and has no incentive to verify
such statements.
The lesson for the law of deceit is that fear of misrepresentations in
financial markets will induce more verification than in markets for real
goods. Distrust in statements about a security will induce verification
around the world. Distrust in statements about the need for snowblowers leads to verification by local buyers only. Since verification is
wasteful, the misrepresentation that produces less of it is comparatively
benign and the law should treat it more leniently.
35. See Guttman, supra note 31.
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THE GREATER FREQUENCY OF FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

The incentive to verify is also influenced by the expected frequency
of misrepresentations. If information is false only 1%of the time, and in
such a case it causes a loss of $100, the incentive to verify is one dollar
strong. If verification costs more than $1, a risk-neutral market participant will not verify. If information may be wrong half the time, the riskneutral individual would spend up to $50 to separate a lie from the truth.
Risk-aversion accentuates the importance of frequency.36
The question of whether misrepresentations should be expected
with greater frequency in real or financial markets is not subject to
empirical verification, because of the differences in regulating misrepresentations in both markets. Consequently, the frequency that results
from current incentives is irrelevant. We must imagine identical rules in
both financial and real misrepresentations. It is not possible to go back
in time and compare real and financial markets before securities laws
were developed. Furthermore, such a comparison would be inconclusive since the securities markets have evolved dramatically in the meanwhile. Attempts to empirically judge the reaction to the passage of
federal securities laws remain controversial.3 7

The only available

36. Compare two lotteries, one paying $1,001 with a 99% probability or $901 with a 1%
probability to one paying $1,050 or $950 with a 50% probability each. While a risk-neutral
investor would consider the two equivalent, a risk-averse one would prefer the former lottery.
Proof: Assume individuals' risk aversion takes the form of a utility of wealth function U(w)
that has constant relative risk aversion, U(w)=w-a)/(1-a), where w is wealth, and a is the
coefficient of risk aversion. See generally, Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion,
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNTH ARRow 147 (1984).
These individuals face a fair gamble which exposes them to a fluctuation of their wealth
equal to a fraction n, where 0<n<l, meaning that the difference between winning and losing is nw,
and the gamble is fair in that the expected wealth remains w. The probability of winning or
losing, however, changes, as do the consequences of winning or losing. One wins with probability
p and the winnings are (1-p)nw, and loses with probability (1-p) and the loss is -pnw, leaving the
expected wealth constant regardless of the type of gamble chosen (which is defined by p).
Effectively the previous example compared two alternative such gambles, one with p=.99 and one
with p=.5, while w=$1,000, and n=.I. Extreme values of p close to 0 or 1 imply gambles where
very small changes in wealth are expected with great probability and large changes are very
unlikely. Values of p close to .5 imply even gambles, where both outcomes are nearly equally
likely and both significantly different than current wealth. This model captures risk aversion
through the expected utility of wealth EU, which is EU(w)=pU(w[l+(1-p)n])+(l-p)U(w[l-pn]).
The undesirability of giving up an extreme value of p to approach a more even gamble takes
the form of the marginal expected utility of a change in p, i.e., dEU/dp. Indeed that is negative
and decreasing in risk aversion when p is close to 0 (implying that evening-out the gamble by
increasing p is increasingly undesirable as risk aversion increases) and positive and increasing in
risk aversion when p is close to 1 (implying that evening out the gamble by decreasing p is
increasingly undesirable as risk aversion increases). Please request more explicit analysis from
the author.
37. The primary classical opponents of disclosure rules are Professors George Stigler and
George Benston. See generally George J. Benston, The Costs and Benefits of GovernmentRequired Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADtS:
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approach is to draw inferences from the incentives for misrepresentations that the two markets offer.
Misrepresentations about real goods offer small gains to their
maker. The price changes the misrepresentations cause, and hence the
profits they generate for misrepresenters, tend to be small, temporary,
and local, as we saw in the previous paragraphs. Financial misrepresentations lend to have a larger impact. The larger gains that financial misrepresentations appear to offer, however, are tempered because the
issuing corporation does not receive all the gains from higher prices that
misrepresentation may cause. Financial misrepresentations occur in a
secondary market. Indeed, it is unclear who profits. Insider trading
rules bar both shareholders and managers from directly taking advantage
of mispricings.38 Usually the gains are indirect: a buyer inflates the
price of his own stock before offering it for the target corporation's
stock; higher prices in one's own corporation lead to higher bonuses,
stock options, and other forms of compensation tied to performance.
Although the benefits are indirect, the size of financial gains from misrepresentations are staggering compared to those available from misrepresentations about real goods.
If the incentives to make financial misrepresentations are stronger,
they should be expected with greater frequency than misrepresentations
about real goods. If financial misrepresentations are undesirable, the
legal system must either increase penalties or increase the probability
that financial misrepresentations will be penalized. The fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance, which allows securities fraud class
actions to go forward more easily than deceit class actions, increases the
probability that financial misrepresentations will be penalized. 39 An
GOVERNANCE AND REFORM 37-69 (Debra A. DeMott ed. 1980); George J. Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am.
EcON. REV. 132 (1973); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus.
117 (1964). Representing the opposing school are: Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, Professor

Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. Bus. 106 (1965); Gregg A. Jarrell,
The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 613 (1981); Morris Mendelson, Economics and the Assessment of Disclosure
Requirements, I J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 49 (1978).
38. Two types of rules prohibit insider trading. First, certain trades by defined insiders are
blocked by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994).
Section 16 awards to the corporation any profits that may accrue to an insider from trades that are
less than six months apart and also prohibits short-selling the corporation's stock. Second, there
are interpretations of the anti-fraud provisions of securities regulations, primarily SEC Rule IOb-5,
promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1994). Those rules can be read to prohibit trading on material nonpublic information that was
improperly used or obtained. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 24, at 8-14, describing the antiinsider trading interpretations of the anti-fraud rules.
39. Similarly, the standard of proof in securities fraud is easier for plaintiffs to meet than the
standard for common law deceit. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-88
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increased probability of liability leads to deterrence.
5.

THE HIGH COST OF VERIFYING FINANCIAL INFORMATION

How costly is it to verify information about real goods? Everyone
has verified information in some type of transaction. For example, used
car buyers can verify the condition of the complex machine's mechanical operation at any garage for about $35. Home buyers can check the
house's mechanical and structural soundness for under $200 by hiring an
inspector. Consider these amounts as a percentage of the purchase price.
The $35 would be 3.5% of a $1,000 car or approximately 1% of a
$3,000 car. A $100 appraisal is 0.1% of a $100,000 house. Verification
of a $500,000 house for $150 represents 0.0003% of the purchase price.
Verifying information about securities, however, is prohibitively
costly and practically impossible. The numerous examples of financial
fraud cases litigated show that the false information could not have been
verified without the cooperation of its maker. Consider the example of
Equity Funding, an insurance company that overstated its assets. The
fraud was exposed by disgruntled ex-employees to Raymond Dirks, a
securities analyst. When Dirks tried to bring the information to light,
respected newspapers and the S.E.C. ignored him. When he had his
clients trade on it, the S.E.C. prosecuted him for insider trading.40
Consistent with what the previous sections explained, the effect of
the misrepresentation on the price of Equity Funding's stock was full,
continuous, and global. The stock traded at the price that fully reflected
the misrepresentation. The misrepresentation influenced price for at
least three years.41 Its effect was global. Equity Funding was based in
California, while the fraud influenced the price of its stock on the New

Yorlk Stock Exchange.
Although huge profits were in store for whomever uncovered the
misrepresentation, the fraud persisted until Dirks got involved. The
costs that Dirks undertook to uncover the misrepresentation were significant. After he received the tip, he left his New York office and went to

California, to interview several employees of Equity Funding. Despite
the fact that senior management denied wrongdoing, he pursued his
efforts for two weeks, until he could corroborate the allegations of

fraud.42
(1983) (maintaining preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in securities fraud actions
while rejecting clear and convincing standard applicable to common law deceit).
40. Dirks v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
41. The SEC first received information about fraud at Equity Funding in 1971. The discovery
led the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in Equity Funding on March 27, 1973. Id.
at 650 & n.3.
42. Id. at 649-50.
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The example of Equity Funding is striking. Government auditors
had reviewed the corporation's books and missed the fraud. How likely
was it that anyone would have uncovered the fraud without the help of
an insider? This example shows that financial frauds can be prohibitively expensive and nearly impossible to uncover.
To summarize, financial misrepresentations have a larger and
longer impact on prices, have a more global audience, are more frequent,
and are costlier to verify than misrepresentations about real goods. It
should be obvious that financial fraud poses a greater threat than real
fraud, and its rules should increase the likelihood that a securities fraud
plaintiff succeeds. Nevertheless, the objection could be made that fraud
in secondary securities markets does not decrease social welfare, and
therefore efforts to curb it are unnecessary. The next section disputes
this contention and argues that verification is at least as wasteful in secondary securities markets as it is in markets for real goods.
D. The Undesirabilityof Verification Incentives in
FinancialMarkets
A presumption of reliance that allows securities fraud class actions
to go forward where deceit class actions would fail seems to be a perfect
answer. But the proponents of laissez-faire securities fraud rules argue
that fraud in secondary securities markets is not as undesirable as fraud
in real markets, primarily because investors may diversify away the risk
of fraud.4 3 This Section rebuts that argument. On the one hand, the
arbitrage (informed) trading necessary to preserve accurate prices is by
nature undiversified, and burdening arbitrageurs with fraud risk reduces
their ability to make the market efficient. On the other hand, even diversified (uninformed) trading is subject to the risk of fraud if the resulting
mispricings are biased or correlated. When uninformed traders face the
risk of fraud, they have incentives either to become informed in order to
avoid the risk, or to trade less frequently. Both effects are undesirable
because they reduce liquidity. Uninformed traders may also demand
higher returns in order to invest in the stock market, in which case firms
will face a higher cost of capital.
43. See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 639.
Moreover, the losses associated with lies issuers tell to secondary-market

participants are diversifiable risks from the latter's viewpoint. Investors who hold
the market portfolio and trade only in response to changes in their income and
consumption levels are as likely to make trading gains as trading losses from
secondary-market fraud.
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MARKET EFFICIENCY DEPENDS ON UNDIVERSIFIED
INFORMED TRADING

One of the greatest inroads of financial theory was the discovery
that diversification eliminates the risk associated with holding stocks.
By holding numerous stocks, investors lose little or no sleep over the
performance of any single one. Price changes of one stock are compensated by opposite changes in the price of others." Those who argue that
diversified investors also diversify the risk of fraud assume that diversified holdings imply diversified trading. A diversified portfolio can be
constructed and liquidated by buying stocks one at a time. Although the
popularity of mutual funds allows investors to trade their diversified
portfolios, such trading is definitely not the rule. Even if, for the sake of
argument, we concede that investors always make diversified trades, the
question becomes whose trading corrects erroneous prices and returns
the market to its efficient state. The CAPM assumes that arbitrageurs,
informed traders, will step in whenever prices are inaccurate and will
correct them. By definition, these traders are exposed to the risk of the
single security in which they trade. But to understand the definition of
informed traders and why they are not diversified, we must return to
Market Microstructure, the new financial area that examines the interaction of market participants in greater detail than microeconomics, and its
answer to a related puzzle of financial theory, the efficiency paradox.
The efficiency paradox is an outgrowth of the CAPM, which only
examines trading motivated by information. In the world of the CAPM,
erroneous prices are averted because traders arbitrage them against portfolios with equal risk (beta). The efficiency paradox asks what happens
if in such a world market prices are perfectly accurate. The CAPM
answer is that there would be no trading since there are no arbitrage
opportunities. But lack of trading implies no market, which leads to the
paradox that in its most efficient state a market disappears. 45
Market Microstructure explains that the CAPM oversimplifies the
motives for market participation. Granted, some traders are motivated
by trading profits, but others use the market as a long-term depository
for their savings. Since history shows the stock market offers a return of
6% above bonds, it is desirable for passive long-term investment.4 6
These long-term investors are not motivated by information. They buy
when they have disposable income, and they sell when they need to dip
44. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 20.

45. See also supra Figure 2.
46. The return of worldwide equities since 1960 averaged 12.7%, while an investor in U.S.
bonds would have enjoyed an average return of only 6.83%. See HANDBOOK OF MODERN
FINANCE 18-21, Table 18.9 (Dennis Logue ed. 1990).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:671

into their savings. Their trading is motivated by decisions to save or
consume, not by information.
The presence of uninformed traders averts the efficiency paradox.
Even if prices are perfectly accurate, the uninformed still buy and sell.
In the very short term their trades move prices and create "noise," the
small jagged price movements from trade to trade.47 By correcting the
errors in prices that the uninformed create, informed traders survive and
limit noise. When the error in the prices is large enough, it gives rise to
profitable informed trading-what the CAPM calls an arbitrage
opportunity.
There is no paradox in the interaction of the informed and the uninformed traders. The uninformed, through long-term investment, share in
the economic growth that propels the stock market. But this participation is only possible because of the intervention of informed traders
whose profits effectively come out of the pockets of the uninformed.
From the perspective of the uninformed this is the cost of participating
in a market with accurate prices, without pursuing information. This
interaction is similar to a contractual arrangement where the uninformed
hire the informed to ensure that they trade at accurate prices. The uninformed trade at slightly "noisy" prices, and this compensates the
informed for keeping prices accurate.48
The effects of financial misrepresentations must be examined in
this context. Diversification is obviously not a panacea that eliminates
the need for fraud rules. Only the uninformed can trade diversified. The
informed traders, by definition, only trade in the securities that have
incorrect prices. They cannot diversify themselves against the risk of
fraud. The question is how do the informed react to the risk of fraud.
Informed traders must be compensated for losses they incur due to
misrepresentations, or they will not service the market and correct
prices. Their compensation can come from two sources. First, informed
47. The fact that trades move prices in the short term has been irrefutably proven in countless
empirical studies. Those that use Microstructure methods are Jerry Hausman et al., An Ordered
Probit Analysis of Transaction Stock Prices, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 357 (1992) (noting that
"[tirading a larger quantity [of stock] always yields a larger price impact"), and Roger D. Huang
& Hans R. Stoll, Market Microstructureand Stock Return Predictions, 7 Rv. FIN. STUDIES 179
(1994).

48. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 569-79 (1984); see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The
Implications of 'Discounted'Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 899,
929-30 (1988); Mahoney, supra note 8; Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An
Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74
CORNELL L. REv. 799, 814 (1989); Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation under Section 10(b):
Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Act of 1934, 1988 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 401
(1988).
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traders can reevaluate all securities prices downward, buying only if
prices fall to a lower level. Since securities will pay the same dividend,
at the lower price the same dividend will provide a greater rate of return.
A $1 annual dividend on a $40 stock is a 2.5% annual return. The same
dividend is a 5% return if the stock was bought at $20.
This price lowering strategy, however, will increase the payoffs to
informed traders only if they hold a security long enough to receive its
returns. But informed traders are not long-term holders of securities.
They want to get out of their undiversified position as soon as possible.
Moreover, informed traders only buy some of the time. Frequently,
informed traders sell overvalued securities short. 49 As short-sellers, they
do not receive the higher return, but owe it to the investor from whom
they borrowed to sell short. The higher returns do not help, but hurt,
short-sellers.
The informed traders' alternative is to refrain from correcting small
price errors and to wait for larger deviations. If they only buy significantly undervalued securities and only sell significantly overvalued
securities, they increase their profit each time they trade. Since they are
exposed to fraud in every trade, the increased profit counteracts any loss
due to fraud. The following example illustrates the point that fear of
inaccurate valuations will lead informed traders to not correct small
price deviations.
Example where Correcting Greater Price Errors Compensates
Fraud-RelatedLosses: Informed traders exhibit risk-aversion having a
utility-of-wealthfunction u(w) of the form u(w)= - /,5o They know that
49. Short-selling is the selling of stock that the trader has not previously bought. Thus, the

trader must borrow the stock, sell it, then buy it back in order to return it. The short-seller bets on
a price drop that will allow her to buy back the stock for less than she sold it and therefore profit.
50. The utility-of-wealth function used in this example exhibits constant relative risk
aversion, meaning that individuals react the same way to the gamble of increasing or decreasing
wealth by a given proportion, regardless of their wealth. Constant absolute risk-aversion would
have individuals react identically to gambles for given amounts, regardless of their initial wealth.

This obviously does not happen. Disagreement still exists among economists over whether
individuals exhibit constant relative risk aversion or declining relative risk aversion. The utility
function used in the example has a risk-aversion coefficient of 2, the a of the more general form
u(w)=CI

+C2. The constant C1 is 1, and C2 is 0 in the example.

Citations on risk-aversion have been collected in Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Compensationfor Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984):
Support for the view that absolute risk aversion declines with wealth is given by H.
RAIFFA,

DECISION

ANALYSIS:

INTRODUCTORY

LECTURES

ON

CHOICE

UNDER

UNCERTAINTY (1968); Hicks, Liquidity, 72 ECON. J. 787 (1962); Pratt, Risk Aversion

in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122 (1964); Yaari, Some Remarks
on Measures of Risk Aversion and on Their Uses, 3 J. EcON. THEORY 315 (1969).
For a discussion of the evidence concerning relative risk aversion, see Cohn,
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the potentialfor misrepresentationsmakes their valuations subject to a
potential variation of 20%, so thatfirms they consider worth $100 may
be worth $80 or $120 (there is a 50% chance of each error occurring).
If they were to gamble their entire wealth on such a trade, they would
prefer that there was no possibility that misrepresentationswould cause
their valuations to be wrong. If they were certain that their valuations
were accurate, they would know that after the trade, when prices
returned to their accurate level, their terminal wealth w, would be their
initial wealth, wb times the inverse of the undervaluation. So if they
bought stock at 99% of its value, their terminal wealth would be w,=w./
.99. If they bought $99 worth of this stock, they would end up with $100
($99199). But their aversion to risk makes them dislike the possibility
that they could end up with $80 or $120 despite the fact that their
expected wealth, Ew, is equal to their terminal wealth under certainty.
Their expected (average)utility E(u) from the trade, under these circumstances, is the average of the utility to which each outcome would lead.
Due to risk aversion, this is less than the utility of the average of the two
outcomes, u($100). Thus, the expected utility is the sum of [the 50%
probability of a decline to 80% of the trader'svaluation times the utility
of a wealth 80% of the terminal wealth]plus [the 50% probabilityof the
rise to 120% times the utility of 120% of the terminal wealth].
Formally:
E(u)
= .5 u(.8 wd + .5 u(J.2 w)
.5

.5

-

E(u)

.8wt

1.2w,1

, or, E(u)

1.041.
1.041.
W

Compare this to the utility of remaining with the initial wealth by not
trading:
1

u(wd

-

wi

Trading reduces utility by as much as a 4.1% reduction in wealth. In
order to be persuaded to trade, the expected utility of wealth must be
greater than the utility of current wealth. How much smaller must
initial wealth be to make trading worthwhile? In other words, at what
percentage of terminal wealth must current wealth be, or at what
Lewellen, Lease & Schlarbaum, Individual Investor Risk Aversion and Investment
Portfolio Composition, 30 J. FIN. 605 (1975); Friend & Blume, The Demandfor
Risky Assets, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 900 (1975); Grossman & Shiller, The
Determinants of the Variability of Stock Market Prices, 71 AM. EcON. REv. 222
(1981).
Id. at 604 n.99.
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percentage x of their inaccurate valuation must traders buy, to
compensatefor their risk-aversion? This is the solution to
u(x w)=.5 u(8 w) + .5 u(1.2 w)
This implies x=.96, which means that the risk-averse traders must
buy shares at less than 96% of their valuation to compensatefor the risk
5
of misrepresentations.'
THE DISCOUNT RISK-AVERSE INFORMED TRADERS REQUIRE IN ORDER
TO TRADE

U(w)
U(12Ew)-

-

--------

/I

ri
U(.8Ew)

.8Ew

I
12Ew

Figure 5: The graphic representation of risk-aversion shows how a utility-of-wealth function with upward but declining slope transforms what appears to be a fair gamble into a reduction
in wealth. Our trader puts her wealth on the line because she has appraised a stock to be worth
100% of its value. If she buys that stock at a discount, the expected value of her holdings is $100,
Ew, despite the fact that she makes a 20% error. If her valuation were accurate she would reap all
the utility of her expected wealth, U(Ew), but the error reduces her expected utility, EU, to the
average of the utility she would derive from a 20% drop in the stock price, U(.8 Ew), and the
utility she would derive from a 20% increase in the stock, U(1.2 Ew). Because this expected
utility is less than the utility of the stock's expected value, she will only buy if the discount is
sufficient to cover the difference. Here that would be if the stock is below 96% of its expected
value, .96 Ew. This value at which a risk-averse actor is indifferent between the uncertain outcome and the certain but lesser wealth is often referred to as the "certainty equivalent" of the
uncertain outcome. This figure uses the utility function of the above example, U(w)=-l/w.

The point of the above example is that informed traders can overcome risk aversion not by lower prices but by more incorrect prices. In
51. More formally, if a discount of D is expected with probability P and a premium of R is
expected with probability Q, while with probability l-(P+Q) the valuation is accurate, then the
discount x at which shares will be bought is given by the solution to:
u(x w)=p u( (1-d) w) + q u( (l+r) w) + (l-p-q) u(w), =>
x=(d-r+dr-1)/ [(l-p+(l-p-q)r)d-(l+q)r-1], or if R=D and Q=P, then
x=(d 2-l)/[(1-2p)d 2- 1]. Both versions of x are positive and smaller than I for
the relevant values of the parameters (remember that 2 p!l or p+q:l).
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the example, risk-averse traders would only trade if prices deviated by
more than 4% from their accurate valuation. This 4% is the profit margin the informed traders require to trade if misrepresentations influence
their valuations by 20%. If valuations are also inaccurate for other reasons, which they must be since they are based on predictions, then risk is
greater and informed traders will require a greater margin of error to
trade. A wide margin of error in prices means that prices will deviate
significantly from their accurate level, eroding the efficiency of the
stock market. But this undesirable effect on informed traders is not the
end of the ills that misrepresentations cause. They also undesirably
affect uninformed traders, in spite of their diversification.
2.

THE DANGER OF MISREPRESENTATIONS IS UNDESIRABLE EVEN FOR
DIVERSIFIED UNINFORMED TRADERS

So far the rebuttal of the laissez-faire-securities-fraud arguments
accepted the assumption that diversified trading eliminates the risk of
misrepresentations. The premise of this assumption, however, is that
misrepresentations induce price errors that on average cancel each other
out (i.e., have a mean of zero) and are independent, meaning that inflation of one security does not make inflation of other securities more
likely. But there is no empirical support for any of the conditions that
laissez-faire-securities-fraud scholars assume exist. Errors caused by
misrepresentations may be biased and have means different than zero.
There is evidence pointing in this direction.52
The existence of mean-zero price errors, positive and negative
errors that cancel out, and of independence between errors is necessary
for diversification to eliminate the effects of misrepresentations. If misrepresentations raise or lower prices on average, then uninformed traders
averse to risk will not trade, lest they buy inflated stocks or sell undervalued stocks. Even if misrepresentation-induced errors were, on average, zero, diversified traders would still fear misrepresentations if their
effects on stock prices were not independent. They would no longer
count on the inflations to offset the undervaluations. A lack of independence means that even if over time overvaluations cancel out undervaluations, at the time they are trading it is likely that more stocks will either
be overvalued or undervalued. Cycles of euphorias and crashes are
52. Indirect evidence that deceptive overvaluations tend to be more prevalent appears in
Jennifer Francis et al, Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures, 32 J. ACCT. Rs. 137
(1994). For evidence by implication of correlation in price changes, see Tim Loughran & Jay
Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23 (1995) (stating that IPOs tend to precede poor
performance of either the entire market or the segment corresponding to the IPO firm; this
strongly implies that there is some widespread overvaluation when IPOs take place in great
numbers and some undervaluation when they do not).
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manifestations of this interdependence. 3 Again, risk-averse traders fear
buying when most stocks are overpriced or selling when most are
underpriced.
Uninformed traders can react in three ways to the fear of misrepresentations. They can trade less frequently, filter out stocks influenced
by misrepresentations from their trades, or demand a higher return to
hold the securities. All three reactions, alone or in combination, are
undesirable because they erode the liquidity and efficiency of the
market.
a. Compensating the Uninformed Through Longer Holding Periods:
Illiquidity That Leads to Inefficiency
Since uninformed traders are exposed to losses from fraud only
when they trade, a simple way to reduce this undesirable exposure is to
trade less. Traders achieve this by lengthening their holding periods.
Example of Canceling the Cost of Fraudby Lengthening Holding
Periods:54 Uninformed traders are risk averse, andprefer some reduction in wealth to trading due to their fear offraud. Assume that uninformed traders equate trading to a 1% reduction in wealth. Suppose,
however, that by investing their wealth in the stock market they enjoy an
11% return, which is greaterthan their other investment alternatives. If
they place all their wealth in the stock marketfor one year, there will be
two 1% reductions, one for buying and one for selling. But they will
enjoy an 11% increase in wealth, leaving them approximately 9% better
off If uninformed traders were to wait two years before liquidating,
however, they would enjoy a 22% increase in wealth with the same 2%
53. The possibility that false prices exist according to a discounted present value model is

disconcerting to economists who think that traders who make the mistake of buying overvalued
assets soon go bankrupt. However, academics recently have formulated theories under which
false prices may exist. The economic literature calls irrational traders "noise traders" and market
euphorias that support high prices "bubbles." See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of
Noise Traders in FinancialMarkets, 64 J. Bus. 1 (1991); J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader
Risk in FinancialMarkets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990). De Long analyzes a model postulating
that the existence of noise traders that "follow the crowd" may induce rational traders to anticipate

such trends, enter in their beginning, and initiate them in J. Bradford De Long et al., Positive
Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379, 380-83

(1990). Further, De Long and Shleifer found evidence supporting the existence of bubbles in J.
BRADFORD DE LONG & ANDREI SHLEIFER, THE BUBBLE OF 1929: EVIDENCE FROM CLOSED-END
FUNDS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3523, 1990). The author
compared the ratio of the closed-end fund premium before the two crashes, 1929 and 1987, to its
historical level. In 1929, the fund premiums averaged 60%. From this the authors suggest a
bubble larger than 30% existed before the crash. Id. The authors' data does not cover 1987, but
in 1985, as well as in 1969-70, closed-end funds were selling at premiums.
54. For a thorough and formal model of the influence of transaction costs on the length of
holding period and the rate of return, see Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricingand
the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. FIN. EcON. 223 (1986).
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fraud transaction cost. If investors need a 10% annual return, after
costs, to put theirfunds in the market, they will only invest in the market
if they can leave thefunds therefor two years. A further increase in the
risk of fraud to 2% per trade, could be overcome without increasing
market return, but by lengthening the holdingperiod to four years. Over
that time investors' wealth would increase 44%, while their two trades
would reduce wealth by 4%, leaving the same 10% annual return after
costs.55
Just because longer holding periods can compensate uninformed
traders for fraud costs does not eliminate the undesirability of fraud.
The harm behind longer holding periods takes us back into Market
Microstructure and three key findings: (i) trading volume increases market liquidity, (ii) liquidity lowers the costs for informed traders and,
therefore, increases their number and their trading, and (iii) more
informed trading leads to more accurate prices and more efficient markets. Before examining this chain, which shows that a decrease in trading threatens efficiency, a better grasp on the concept of market liquidity
is necessary.
Liquidity is the market's capacity to satisfy trading requests. When
an investor wants to buy or sell, the market must provide a counterpart.
Liquidity means that this counterpart will be easily found. The opposite
state is illiquidity. The difficulty to fulfill trading requests ("orders")
that illiquidity implies has two aspects, one temporal and one regarding
price. The temporal aspect of the difficulty in finding a counterpart is
delay. The investor may submit his order but may have to wait a long
time to find a counterpart. The price aspect of this difficulty means that
the trader will have to offer a price concession to attract a counterpart.
The investor who wants to buy may be unable to buy at the current
market price and may have to offer a premium price before someone
agrees to trade with him. 56 Time and price are substitutes in this setting.
55. For simplicity of computation, I assume no compounding of interest, and take the cost of
fraud in both transactions to be a proportion of the initial wealth. In fact the cost of fraud in the
liquidating transaction should be a proportion of the wealth after it has increased. A simple
adjustment would show the same conclusions come across even more strongly after annual

compounding. If the cost of fraud is equal to a reduction of wealth by a proportion f, so that the
trader's wealth after fraud costs is w-fw = w(l-f), where w is current wealth, the return after
fraud costs r* is r*=[(l +r)-f( +r)n-f](lM)- 1, where r is the return of the market before costs and n
is the length of the investment period in years. This is the relevant solution for r* of
w(l+r*)n=w(l+r)n(l-f)-wf , where w is the initial wealth. If, according to the hypothesis, the

market return is 11% (r.1 1) and fraud costs are 2% (f=-.02), an after-costs return of 10 percent
(r*>.l0) is achieved if the investor holds for longer than n=3.76 years. If the fraud costs are 1%
then an after costs return of over 10% is achieved in 2.02 years.
56. The most obvious expression of this liquidity is that large, block trades cause price

moves. This puzzled economists before the advent of Microstructure. See, e.g., JAMEs H. LORIE
ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET, THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 69 (2d ed. 1985) (citing empirical studies
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The trader who is in a hurry will have to purchase at a premium. But the
investor can avoid buying at a premium if he is willing to wait.
The organization of stock exchanges reflects these features of
liquidity. They are most obvious in exchanges using market-makers,
specialists who have an obligation to trade at the prices and up to the
quantities they announce with any investor. For example, on January 4,
1993, at 10:00 am, the IBM specialist was willing to buy 800 shares at
$51/4 ("Bid") and to sell 3,300 shares at $51 /2 ("Ask").57 Because the
specialist must always stand ready to buy and to sell, he cannot do so for
an unlimited number of shares or he would fall prey to informed traders.
Exchanges with specialists make it easy to observe liquidity. It
shows in the specialist's willingness to trade. A willing specialist represents a liquid market. He would fulfill larger trades with smaller price
concessions than an unwilling specialist, who corresponding to an illiquid market, would only trade small quantities while rapidly readjusting
prices to the traders' disadvantage.
Compare in the following hypothetical trading scenarios how a specialist would behave in liquid and illiquid markets.
Liquid Market Example: Trader approaches the specialist to buy
1,000 shares at $100 per share. The specialist, having announced an
Ask of $100 per sharefor 1,000 shares, accepts but adjusts his Ask to
$1001 for 500 shares.
IlliquidMarket Example: The trader approachesthe specialistfor
an identical trade. The Ask is again at $100 per share, but for only 500
shares. After Trader buys 500 shares the specialist raises the Ask to
1001/2 andfor only 300 shares. After Trader buys another 300 shares,
the specialist changes the Ask again to $101 for 300 shares. Trader
finally completes the purchaseof 1,000 shares, but in the illiquid market
it took three trades and an averageprice of $100.35. Due to the illiquidity, Trader was not only delayed but was also forced to make a
price concession.
The undesirability of fraud depends on the conclusion that less tradconfirming an effect of large transactions on prices, all of which focused on the New York Stock
Exchange, by far the most liquid stock market). A study by Larry Y. Dann in particular found that
large trades move prices, but prices return within fifteen minutes to a level that does not allow

profits after transaction costs. See Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules, Large Blocks and The
Speed of Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1977). The same effect is today considered a natural
component of liquidity. More recent empirical work tries to find how adversely the market reacts
to trades of all sizes. See, e.g., Hausman et al., supra note 47; Huang & Stoll, supra note 47.

57. Data from the New York Stock Exchange Trade And Quotation database on CD-ROM,
Jan. 1994. For the regulation of the specialists, see Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The
Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DuKE L.J. 707; Dale A.
Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the
Exchange Innovate to Survive?, 17 J. CoRP. L. 223 (1992).
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ing will lead to less liquidity. The idea that liquidity depends on trading
volume is generally accepted,- 8 and has been empirically proven. 59 The
legal system must not create incentives to trade infrequently because this
will erode liquidity, a valuable attribute of financial markets. Lack of
liquidity means that traders must pay a premium to trade, in money or
time. This premium is a transaction cost, a drag-force on the economy.
As the above example shows, if prices are equally depressed in
liquid and illiquid markets, the illiquid market may not offer informed
traders enough profits to entice them to trade and correct prices. To
determine the difference in the characteristics of both markets, we must
identify how liquidity influences the strategy of informed traders.
Informed traders can overcome the problem of illiquidity not allowing
large trades without eliminating price errors in two ways. First, the
informed traders may require larger deviations from accuracy before
attempting to correct prices. Alternatively, they can compromise on the
temporal aspect of illiquidity and not require speedy execution of their
trades. In either case, the market's efficiency is compromised. Prices
are less accurate and corrections are delayed.
The theory and evidence of Market Microstructure,6 ° points to an
additional, but less obvious, consequence of illiquidity: as liquidity
decreases due to less uninformed trading, the profits of informed traders
decrease at a rate slower than the reduction of uninformed trading. As a
result, when the profits of informed traders are computed per uninformed trade, they increase compared to those in the liquid market. For
example, if in the liquid market the uninformed traded 200,000 times
over a one month period, the informed would have a profit of $20,000
from their monthly trading, or 10¢ per uninformed trade. If for any reason, such as increased fear of fraud, the uninformed halve their trading
to 100,000 trades per month, the profits of the informed will be reduced
less than proportionately, say to $15,000 per month, or 15¢ per unin58. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 21,324, 49 Fed. Reg.
37,200 (Sept. 21, 1984) (announcing that "BSE [Boston Stock Exchange] shall bill the Montreal
member for standard trade recording and value charges.... Linkage will enable the BSE to attract
additional order flow which in turn enhances the depth and liquidity of the markets of BSE

specialists."); Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange As A Firm: The Emergence
Of Close Substitutes For The New York And Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007,
1015 (1990) (noting that "the more frequently trading opportunities are generated by a firm, the
more liquid we would expect the firm's shares to be.").
59. Hausman et al., supra note 47; Huang & Stoll, supra note 47.

60. The theory is set out in the theoretical model of Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 23.
Their conclusions are validated empirically by Barclay et al., supra note 23. The specific
relationship of increased liquidity leading to profits of informed traders greater in aggregate but
reduced if expressed perunim formed transaction is supported by the evidence of Nejet Seyhun,
Insiders' Profits, Lost of Trading, and Market Efficienty, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986).
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formed trade. Thus, the ratio of informed profits to uninformed trades

increases.
But the profits of informed traders come, in essence, out of the
returns of the uninformed. In the absence of the informed's trading
profits, the uninformed would expect to precisely track the performance
of the overall market. Given that the informed will take their cut, the
uninformed expect to trail the market's performance by the profits of the

informed. The uninformed view the informed trader's profits, however,
as one more transaction cost. This is true because the uninformed only
allow the informed to profit if they trade. Each uninformed trader
knows that he can avoid trailing the market by not trading. The uninformed trader who never trades is assured of matching the performance
of the market. It is by trading that he allows the informed to take away
some value. 6 Since illiquidity led the informed to profit more per unin-

formed trade, illiquidity increases this transaction cost for uninformed
traders, and, thus, has a feedback effect. If uninformed traders reduce
their trading due to fear of fraud, they will reduce liquidity. The reduced
liquidity will result in larger trading costs in the form of losses to the
informed. The uninformed will counter this increased trading cost the
same way they countered their fear of fraud, by requiring even higher
returns or by reducing their trading and lengthening their holding periods even more.62

b. The Undesirable Incentive to Become Informed
Uninformed traders who want to avoid risk may try to avoid trading
61. A simple example illustrates how the uninformed view the per-uninformed-trade profits
of informed traders as a transaction cost.
Assume a firm with total capitalization of $100, $90 of which is held by uninformed traders
and $10 by informed traders. Informed traders, predicting a price drop, sell $5 of their holdings,
meaning informed traders hold $5 and uninformed traders $95. Informed traders' expectations
materialize and the market falls 20%, leaving uninformed traders with 95% of $80, or $76, and
informed traders with $4. By reducing their stake from $10 to $5, the informed avoided having it
shrink from $10 to $8. Informed traders readjust their holdings to 10% ($8) until they predict a
price rise, whereupon they increase their holdings to 15%, or $12. The market rises, returning to
its original $100 level. Informed traders now hold $15 and uninformed traders $85. By
increasing their stake the informed managed to have $12 grow to $15 instead of $10 grow to $12.
In the course of the two price moves, informed traders first avoided losing $1 and subsequently
gained $1 more than if they had passively held 10%. The uninformed traders trail the market by
$2 and the informed traders lead it by $2.
62. Unlike the informed, the uninformed do not benefit from larger price errors or slower
trading. These benefits presuppose informed trading. Larger price errors will not help the
uninformed because they do not choose to buy or sell based on whether the price is inflated or a
bargain. Slower trading does not help the uninformed avoid losing to the informed or to fraud
because it does not impact those losses, although it may cause them to be more widely spread
among uninformed traders. An extensive description of these dynamics can be found in
Georgakopoulos, supra note 24.
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those stocks subject to fraud. When uninformed traders weed out stocks
affected by fraud, their trading is no longer perfectly diversified or uninformed. They may avoid fraud risk if they are accurate, but their
reduced diversification may also increase their exposure to fraud. In
both cases, imperfect diversification results in unsystematic risk which is
undesirable. Moreover, since uninformed traders expend resources to
determine which stocks are subject to fraud risk, they no longer fit the
definition of uninformed traders. Their trading may still be motivated
by liquidity needs, a desire to save or consume, but more remotely.
Their stock choices are now motivated by information of which stocks
are not subject to fraud risk.
The incentive uninformed traders have to become informed is
undesirable. By diminishing the ranks of uninformed traders, fraud risk
interferes with a delicate balance that preserves the efficiency and
liquidity of securities markets. As we saw above,6 3 the conventional
version of the CAPM leads to the efficiency paradox, where as prices
become perfectly accurate all trading ceases. Market Microstructure
solved the paradox by identifying trading that is not motivated by information. Although informed trading is necessary for market efficiency,
uninformed trading is necessary for market liquidity, which, in turn, is a
prerequisite for informed trading. The result of a good mix of informed
and uninformed trading is a liquid and efficient market. When the risk
of fraud deters uninformed trading, it tampers with this delicate balance.
Excess informed trading may give the appearance of efficiency, but it
comes at the expense of liquidity.
A reduction in liquidity is very undesirable. Illiquidity hurts
informed and uninformed traders, as well as the firms that seek to raise
capital. It impedes the overall workings of the stock market and demoralizes traders. Because the market cannot afford to allow the potential
for fraud to reduce its liquidity, it cannot have lenient requirements for
the tort of securities fraud.
c.

Requiring Higher Returns: Costlier Capital for Firms

While the fear of fraud may lead the uninformed to hold securities
longer or to trade with information, it should lead them to value securities at a lower price. They will require that securities produce higher
returns to compensate them for fraud risk.
However, allowing uninformed traders to demand higher returns
from the stock market is detrimental to productivity. The purpose of
capital markets is not to facilitate investment, but to help firms raise
63. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
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capital. When investors demand a higher return from their investments,
they force firms raising capital to pay a higher price for it. The goods of
firms that face high costs of capital are axiomatically more costly than
goods produced by otherwise equivalent firms with lower capital costs.
Thus, lax securities fraud rules reduce productivity.
One could answer that the danger of the increased cost of capital
due to laissez-faire securities fraud rules does not increase the cost of all
capital but only of that which is publicly issued. Both private placements of equity and private placements of debt (usually bank financing)
are possible alternatives. This answer fails regarding both equity and
debt.
Inducing increased reliance on bank financing is undesirable
because-as the unfortunate Japanese and German experience
shows6"-powerful banks impose their interest in risk-averse management of the corporation at the expense of shareholders and the economy,
who being diversified, prefer risk-neutrality. Bondholders, who are dispersed and do not have the negotiating power of banks, cannot impose
the same undesirable incentives on management.
Increased reliance on private equity financing turns the clock back
over a century on corporate and securities developments. Equity holders
benefit from having their stock publicly traded because it can become
part of diversified portfolios, in which it will be valued by risk-neutral
holders. Private holdings imply lack of diversification and, hence, riskaverse valuations of the stock. Private placements of equity will, therefore, be costlier for the firm. Public issuances also allow firms to tap a
wider source of capital, enabling larger projects and corporations.
The laissez-faire-securities-fraud proponents may press their point
by countering that the transition may not be from public to private
financing in both equity and debt. Because debt markets are more efficient, the danger of fraud will increase the inefficiency of the equity
markets more than that of the debt markets. Although firms may rely
less on public equity, the shift can be toward public debt, which would
counter both the undesirable reliance on bank financing as well as allow
firms to solicit funds from the public. Thus, they would argue, fraud

64. See Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative
Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2029 (1993) (relaxation of Japanese regulations led to
decline of reliance on bank financing, and more so for successful firms; this implies the old

scheme promoted inefficient management; citations omitted). Professors Macey and Miller show
that banks have led to inefficient risk-aversion in German and Japanese firms. Jonathan R. Macey

& Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative
Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States (1995) (manuscript on file with Miami
Law Review and the author).
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risk operates as an incentive to rely on public debt financing, which may
not be undesirable.
Fraud's undesirability cannot be reduced by this answer either.
From a social perspective, we are not indifferent between incentives to
rely on public debt or equity financing. Debt tends to be short-term
compared to equity. Five, ten, even twenty year bonds are due in a
small fraction of the time a corporation hopes to survive. Inducing firms
to rely on debt financing leads them to favor short-term strategic concerns over long-term concerns and aggravates management's already
undesirable tendency to focus on the short-term.65
Finally, fear of fraud will also tend to reduce the amount of capital
available to firms because of the lengthening of holding periods it will
force on individuals. When investors require longer horizons to invest
in securities, the fraction of total wealth that is not available to finance
production (cash equivalents) will increase, further increasing the cost of
capital and reducing productivity.
Although no one offers empirical proof that fear of fraud leads to a
lower cost of capital, it is worth noting that the United States has both
the lowest cost of capital and the strictest securities regulation in the
world. The cost of capital in the United States is 6% above inflation.
The rest of the world has a higher cost, by nearly 50%, at more than 9%
above inflation.66 Economists have shown this difference is not due to
65. There is an inherent bias for firms to respond to issues that influence the value of debt
more than to issues that influence the value of stock-the greater efficiency of the debt market.
Debt is easy to value because its future income stream is known, captured by the interest rate.
Moreover, if debt valuation is wrong, it is easy to make riskless arbitrage trades to take advantage
of and correct the errors. Such trades have limited risk because debt securities will mature in the
relatively near future and allow the arbitrage transaction to wind up.
By contrast, the valuation of stock is much more difficult. Neither the future earnings nor the
risk to the firm can be observed. Arbitrage transactions are hampered by the indefinite duration of
the stock investment. Unlike debt, which is converted to cash on its due date, stocks are rarely
converted to cash, except in takeovers or liquidations. Since arbitrageurs cannot predict the time
at which the value of the assets they are trading will assume their true value, arbitrage transactions
are more risky and less attractive. The result is that less arbitrage occurs in the stock market than
in the debt markets. Since arbitrageurs monitor the accuracy of prices, debt prices are more
accurate than stock prices. Professors Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny start with this premise
and argue that the result of the difference in efficiency between debt and equity markets is
detrimental because firms and corporate managers become more sensitive to fluctuations in debt
value, rather than in fluctuations in stock value. Since firms and managers want to have high
values for their securities (whether debt or equity) so capital will cost less, firms will respond
more to those concerns which change the value of debt rather than those issues which change the
value of equity. This is undesirable, Shleifer and Vishny argue, because the short-term nature of
debt makes managers and firms focus on the short term, while they should focus their strategic
efforts on the long term. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of
Investors and Firms, 80 Am. ECON. REV. 148 (1990).
66. See HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE, supra note 46, at 18-21. Average annual returns of
U.S. equities from 1960 to 1987 were 11.13% (arithmetic mean), while foreign equities returned
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volatility. 67 Law-and-economics offers a better explanation: a stricter
legal system, including a reduced fear of fraud. The confidence generated by a strict securities fraud regime, however, does not also imply
that the current securities fraud rules are perfect. Part III of this Article
argues that the current fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the
source of securities fraud austerity, can be further perfected.
III.

RELIANCE IN DECEIT AND SECURITIES FRAUD

Part II showed that from a policy perspective, the securities markets
need stricter, more austere measures against misrepresentations than real
goods markets. Part III applies those conclusions to the law, specifically
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance in securities fraud. In
order to understand the doctrine behind reliance, we must start with its
common law ancestor, the reliance required for liability in deceit.
A. Justifiable Reliance in Common Law Deceit
Deceit is one of the more logically intricate torts. The plaintiff's
own actions cause the plaintiff's injury. Recovery for self-inflicted
injury is possible because the plaintiff alleges that his actions were in
response to the defendant's false statement.6" Thus, deceit involves two
causal chains: one from the false statement to the plaintiff's act, and
another from the plaintiff's act to his own injury. Justifiable reliance is
only relevant to the first link.
1.

RELIANCE AS A TEST OF CAUSATION

Reliance is an essential element in the chain of causation connecting the misrepresentation to the plaintiff's injury. The misrepresenta14.82%. Given that CPI inflation was an average of 5.07% (from table 18.1), U.S. equities

offered 6.06% after inflation, while foreign equities offered 9.75% after inflation, a return equal to
160% of the U.S. equities. The standard deviation of the returns of U.S. equities is 16.94%, and of

foreign equities 19.83%, not nearly enough to justify the 60% higher return. Id.
67. Economists have shown that the 8% premium of equities over debt before inflation is not
explained by differences in volatility. Since the difference of volatility among domestic and
international equities is proportionally smaller, the same conclusion should apply. See Rajnish
Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium, A Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 145, 154
(1985).
68. The defendant must also have made this statement with scienter-he must know it is false
or disregard its accuracy-and with the intent to influence the plaintiff's actions. Although
scienter and intent are controversial topics that deserve analysis, they are outside the scope of this
article. Therefore, the necessary intent for culpability is assumed in this article. For more on
intent, see generally WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); David W.

Robertson, Negligence Liabilityfor Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL.
L. REv. 135 (1992); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the
Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980) (hereinafter Shavell, Analysis of Causation].

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:671

tion influences the plaintiff only if the plaintiff relies on the
misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action. Without the
requirement of reliance, any misstatement by a defendant might give rise
to crushing liability. 69 All possible plaintiffs whose actions by chance
coincided with the action suggested by the misrepresentation would benefit. Hence, the element of reliance is a generally accepted test of
causation.7 °

2.

JUSTIFIABILITY AS A TEST OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

Reliance, however, is not the only element of causation. Even if
the plaintiff undertook the injurious actions because he believed in the
defendant's statements, this response may be defective. The plaintiff
may not be justified in believing the statement. A reasonable plaintiff
would know it was false, irrelevant, or insignificant. Both the errors of
believing the misrepresentation and the error of responding to it interrupt
the chain of causation. In these cases, the plaintiff's actions and the
resulting damage are the plaintiff's error. They cannot be attributed to
the misrepresentation. The defendant is not held liable for those damages for the same reason that defendants are not liable for avoidable
consequence injuries.71
An example will illustrate this point. Imagine that the misrepresentation suggests to the plaintiff that to reach the top of a rocky ledge, she
should confidently climb the rocks because they are stable. If the plaintiff overlooked the existence of an obviously superior alternative to
climbing, such as a nearby ladder, and was injured by unstable rocks,
her deceit action will fail because her reliance is unjustified. She made
an independent error by adjusting her actions to a consideration that,
however deceptive, should have been immaterial. Her reliance exists
but is not justified. Her injury cannot be traced to the deceptive statement because her own error interrupts the chain of causation. Therefore,
the climber cannot recover for her injuries.
In sum, the justifiable reliance element of the common law tort of
deceit is not different from causation. The plaintiff must plead that her
actions were, in effect, caused by the defendant because she relied upon
69. The term "crushing liability" is used by Steven Shavell in his pioneering article on
economic analysis of causation to mean that if legal causation concepts are relaxed excessively,

then the tortfeasor will be liable for an extraordinary number of remote consequences of the tort.
This liability would crush any tortfeasor. See Shavell, Analysis of Causation,supra note 69.
70. One of the most respected corporate law commentators, Dean Robert Clark, calls reliance
"a part of the causal chain from violation to injury." ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 329
(1986).
71. See W.
(5th ed. 1984).

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

65, at 458
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the misrepresentation. The defendant can rebut this allegation by claiming that the plaintiff's actions were due to her own error. The defendant
will claim that the injury was an avoidable consequence by pleading that
the plaintiff's reliance was not justifiable. Thus, reliance is identical to
causation, and justifiability is identical to avoidable consequences.
The incorporation of justifiable reliance as an element of the securities fraud offense would not have given rise to any problems if modem
stock exchanges had not developed. However, the efficiency of securities markets changes the way in which a statement can cause injury. In
an efficient market, a misstatement can cause injury without reliance
because it will influence prices. Therefore, requiring reliance as an element of securities fraud makes it underinclusive because many injured
plaintiffs would not be able to recover. The courts respond to this problem, not by abolishing the reliance requirement in securities fraud
actions, which would be the straightforward solution, but by presuming
the securities fraud plaintiffs' reliance.
B.

Securities Fraud Reliance: Fraud-on-the-Market

In the transition from common law to modem securities law, reliance loses much of its importance. Though causation retains its central
role, the process by which modem markets set securities' prices results
in a more objective causation test than reliance, which seeks to subjectively establish the cause of plaintiffs' decisions. The following discussion shows that according to securities fraud jurisprudence, an
individual's actions in the modem securities markets may be influenced
by a misrepresentation even if the individual has not heard the
misrepresentation.
In an efficient securities market, available information is assimilated into securities prices.7 2 Each piece of information adds to or subtracts from the price of the security. This does not mean that there is, by
definition, one "true" price for a security. The price tends to be the
market's best, yet imprecise, estimate of the present value of the future
income stream that the security will produce.73 Furthermore, statistical
72. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 568; Eugene F. Fama, Efficient
CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). But see Eugene
F. Fama, Efficient Markets: 11, 61 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) (finding exceptions to market efficiency).
See also LORIE ET AL., supra note 56; Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecastsof Future Prices, Unbiased
Markets, and "Martingale" Models, 39 J. Bus. 242 (1966); Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That
Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDus. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965).
73. That the price will tend to equal the discounted future income stream of the security is a
generally accepted principle of financial economics. See generally ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ,
EQUITY MARKETS STRUCTURE, TRADING AND PERFORMANCE (1988).
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methods can only point to price changes in response to information; true
price cannot be derived.

Public misrepresentations are assimilated into price as one more
piece of information. By affecting prices, such misrepresentations influence all investors who trade at those prices. Without the misstatement,

all investors would have transacted at a different price, regardless of
reliance on the misrepresentation, or even awareness of it, because in an

efficient securities market the effect of an erroneous statement influences all prices. Traders act on the statement (and may be injured by it)
without having heard it because they transact at a price that is influenced

by the statement. In contrast, misstatements in the common law environment injure only those whose actions are influenced.
The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance evolved in
response to this reasoning. The presumption was developed loosely and
concurrently in several federal circuits with little homogeneity or consistency, starting with dicta in the early 1970s. 74 The theory was established in the early 1980s,1 5 with a lone forerunner in 1975.76 The
Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson7 7 offers a single coherent
source for the theory. In Basic, the Court, starting from the premise that
investors have confidence in the integrity of the market price, con-

structed a presumption of reliance on all public misrepresentations:
An investor who buys or sells at the price set by the market does so in
reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on
any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed
for the purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action.78
Reliance on the misrepresentation is presumed because of investors' "reliance on the integrity of [the market] price. ' 79 The dissenters in
74. See, e.g., Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
75. See Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 361 n.ll (5th Cir. 1987); Peil v.
Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.ll (3d Cir. 1986).
76. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
77. 485 U.S. 224 (1987). This was a class action of sellers who allegedly sold at prices
depressed because of Basic's fraudulent denials of rumors about merger negotiations. The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's finding that statements denying rumors were per se
material, as well as the district court's bright-line test that statements about corporate
combinations are not material before a preliminary agreement. The Court also set case-by-case
standards of materiality, defined a rebuttable fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, and
remanded.
78. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
79. Id. Some circuit courts have considered this phrase not to define reliance but to be a
license to develop their own fraud-on-the-market theories. See, e.g., Abel v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "Basic essentially allows each of the circuits
room to develop its own fraud-on-the-market rules ... a new, largely undefined, version of this
presumption of reliance").
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Basic, through Justice White's opinion, objected to what they saw as a
claim that the market price becomes equal to "true value" through some
"metaphysical process," the existence of which courts cannot ascertain:
"While the scholastics of the medieval times professed a means to make
I doubt that the federal
such a valuation of a commodity's 'worth',
80
courts of our time are similarly equipped.
Justice White's objection was probably founded on a view that
fraud-on-the-market meant that traders would be allowed to rely on the
market for accurate pricing of their securities, and therefore indirectly
rely on the statements that may influence these valuations. Fraud-onfrom indirect reliance, which is
the-market, however, is distinguishable
8

accepted in common law deceit. '
1.

DISTINGUISHING FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET

FROM INDIRECT RELIANCE

It is unreasonable to expect courts to determine the accuracy of
market prices. But the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
does not require that the courts establish a security's worth. The investors' reliance on the integrity, or propriety, of market price has little to
do with the level, or accuracy, of that price. The presumption is merely
a claim that investors assume fraudulent information will not be encompassed in the price, an assumption which Basic acknowledges to be

legitimate and protected by Rule 1Ob-5.82 The courts only need to determine that a fraudulent statement has influenced price to the plaintiff's
disadvantage and the amount by which the statement changed the
price.8 3 Courts need not appraise the security's "true" value. 8 4 Justice
White's concern that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
operates as a guarantee of accurate prices is wrong because the presump80. Basic, 485 U.S. at 255 (footnote omitted) (White, J., dissenting).
81.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 2D

§ 533:

The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresentation,
although not made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker
intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance
communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct in the transaction
or type of transaction involved.
82. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (stating that "[t]he presumption of reliance employed in this
case is consistent with, and, by facilitating Rule lob-5 litigation, supports, the congressional
policy embodied in the 1934 Act; in drafting that Act, Congress expressly relied on the premise
that securities markets are influenced by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an
investor's reliance on the integrity of those markets").
83. Id. Both the existence of an influence and its size can easily be measured by statistical
methods of finance. See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns:
The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1986).
84. Notice that "true" value is distinguished from the price that the shares would command
absent the misrepresentation. The courts must find the price that would prevail absent the
misrepresentation, a much easier feat than ascertaining "true" value.
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tion operates only as a guarantee that prices are not manipulated. Prices
may be incorrect for other reasons.
Confusion of fraud-on-the-market with indirect reliance also seems
to be at the center of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent in Mirkin v. Wasserman.85 The dissent appears to disagree with
the majority's refusal to adopt the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance in deceit, arguing that indirect reliance has already been
adopted.

86

Indirect reliance as an element of deceit, however, is distinguishable because the causal chain and the injury to be remedied are different.
Plaintiffs in deceit actions seek to undo the consequences of their reliance, usually by rescinding the transaction into which the misrepresentation led them. By contrast, the securities fraud plaintiffs do not seek to
undo their trades, but seek to recover the portion of the price that they
paid or did not receive due to the inflation or depression that the misrepresentation caused. Instead of reliance causing the transaction (transaction causation), reliance in securities fraud litigation causes the trading
loss (loss causation). Whether without the misrepresentation the price
would have been perfectly accurate is irrelevant. At issue is the influence that the misrepresentation had on price. Under common law indirect reliance, parties whom the misrepresentation did not reach, directly
or indirectly, cannot recover any overpayments they made due to the
misrepresentation. By contrast, under the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, parties who ignore the misrepresentation can recover
overpayments made due to it.
To illustrate, envision a hypothetical investor who purchases a
security. Unknown to our investor, a false statement has elevated the
85. 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
86. Id. After discussing the case law on indirect reliance, the dissent concludes:

As this review of the relevant authorities demonstrates, the fraud-on-the-market
principle that the federal courts developed in rule lob-5 cases is fully consistent
with the Restatement Second of Torts [§ 533] and with California law. In actions for

intentional misrepresentation, our law has never required direct or "eyeball" reliance
to sustain a claim, but has recognized the principle of indirect reliance, under which
a fraudulent statement is no less actionable because it has passed through an

intermediary and in the process has undergone a change in form before inducing
reliance by a party who thereby suffers injury. The price of a security traded in an
open and developed market may express the effect of a fraudulent statement just as

surely as a credit rating (Rest.2d Torts, § 533, com. f), governmental certification
(Learjet Corp. v. Spenlinhauer, 901 F.2d 198), doctor's prescription (Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 708 F.Supp. 1142), or even a child's importuning of a parent to
purchase a particular breakfast cereal (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v.

General Foods Corp., 35 Cal.3d 197). In all such cases, the chain of causation is
unbroken, and the element of reliance is established.
Id. at 590.
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price of this security. The investor has only two choices: to buy or not
to buy. Price cannot be negotiated. If the investor buys, the misstatement will affect his personal finances because it inflated the price at
which he bought the securities. In the traditional caveat emptor environment of the common law, the investor would have no recourse since the
misstatement did not cause the investor to purchase the security. This
example illustrates a type of reliance different from the common law
concept. Our investor paid more based on the misstatement, thereby
acting on it. It should not matter that the investor did not hear the statement. The market "heard" it and priced the securities accordingly, while
the investor perforce "relied" on the market's information and paid the
market price. The fraction of the price attributable to the misrepresentation is paid in reliance on it. Because the fraud-on-the-market presumption attributes the loss due to the inflated or depressed portion of the
price to the misrepresentation, courts and commentators use the term
loss causation in referring to this reliance. This term contrasts with
transaction causation, which refers to the function of reliance in deceit
(and securities fraud in face-to-face transactions).
This loss causation function of fraud-on-the-market must be distinguished from indirect reliance leading to transaction causation. It is easy
to think that the role of the fraud-on-the-market presumption is to allow
reliance on the market valuation. If that was all that the fraud-on-themarket presumption did, its novelty would be marginal. An example
can show that acceptance of reliance on the market's valuation is not a
significant change from the common law concept of reliance. Consider
a pedestrian who, with appropriate intent, misrepresented to a driver the
safety of a route subject to an imminent landslide, knowing that all drivers efficiently exchange their information in meetings of the American
Automobile Association (AAA). A second driver hearing the route is
safe proceeds along it and is buried under the landslide. If the second
driver relied on the statement of a colleague who was reproducing the
pedestrian's statement, he would have indirectly relied on the pedestrian's statement and would be allowed to recover from the pedestrian
under common law.8 7 The example can be tied to securities markets and
87. See, e.g., Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, Inc., 141 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. Ct. App.

1977) (holding that final buyer of an automobile had cause of action for deceit against initial seller
who misrepresented car's title because of indirect reliance on the initial seller's statement to the
intermediate buyer); Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d

660 (Cal. 1983) (finding children watched misleading advertisements and requested. they buy
cereal, sufficiently pleaded reliance in their cause of action for deceit because of indirect reliance
on the statement that was made to the children, even if the children were not alleged to have
repeated the statement to their parents). In Children's Television, the court noted that:
"[riepetition ... should not be a prerequisite to liability; it should be sufficient that defendant
makes a misrepresentation to one group intending to influence the behavior of the ultimate
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prices. Say the pedestrian had actually recommended tires to the drivers, allowing a local shop to sell tires at an inflated price of $10, while
they would otherwise sell for $5. Under deceit rules, the tire purchasers
who do not rely directly or indirectly on the pedestrian's statement have
no recourse against him for the $5 loss they suffer when buying the
tires.8" The fraud-on-the-market theory, however, would allow recovery
on the premise that the extra $5 was paid because the market was influenced by the misstatement. The difference is that common law reliance
operates under the assumption that those drivers who do not like the
price of tires will try to find a different shop or negotiate the price and
that each individual's reasons for participating in a transaction in real
goods are purely subjective and may be unrelated to price. On the other
hand, investors who must buy securities have no alternative market and
price is not negotiable. In the Strauss example, the Court noted that
season-ticket buyers may have wanted to see the opposing teams or to
provide business entertainment rather than to see Julius Erving play.89
In economic terms, as Part II explained, buyers are expected to buy
if the utility they derive from the good exceeds its price. Sellers sell if
prices cover their costs or their lost utility. If all buyers and sellers
behave this way, goods are optimally allocated. Artificial prices, as in
the tire example, cannot be maintained in the long term. 90 The Strauss
example is distinguishable because it is not certain that the Nets would
have charged less for tickets without Erving. The tickets' value would
be lower for buyers who wanted to see Erving, but the demand of buyers
with other motives may have sustained the same price. Indeed, it is not
hard to imagine nonnative New Yorkers who may be fans of other
teams, and therefore prefer the Nets without Erving. The Erving advertisement may have resulted in tickets being bought by the wrong buyers
but not necessarily at a wrong price. 9 1
purchaser, and that he succeeds in this plan." Id. at 674; see also RESTATEMENT
TORTS § 533 (1977):

(SECOND) OF

The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability . . . to

another who acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the misrepresentation, although not
made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has
reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the
other, and that it will influence his conduct.
88. See, e.g., Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)
(holding that buyers of New York Nets' season tickets had insufficiently homogeneous motives
for buying tickets for certification of class action alleging Nets' deceit in advertising Julius Erving
as a member of the team and trading him before the season started).
89. Id. at 236.
90. See supra section IIC I and text accompanying note 27, on the temporary nature of the
influence of misrepresentations.
91. Notice that the contract law remedy of rescission addresses the misallocation of real

goods-they return to their seller and reenter the market.
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Common law appears not to allow buyers to draw the inference that
since the tires' or the tickets' price is high, that their utility to the buyers
is also high. The refusal of common law to allow inferences about the
goods' usefulness (the quality, value, or utility they offer) from their

price is in perfect agreement with the economic theory of pricing nonfinancial goods. Under that theory, as Strauss illustrates, the utility each
buyer derives from the good is unique and different from its price. The
case with financial goods is exactly the opposite, as Part II explained.
2.

THE PROBLEMATIC REQUIREMENT OF BLIND TRUST IN THE
MARKET'S INTEGRITY: THE ZLOTNICK 92 PARADOX

Justice White's objection to the fraud-on-the-market presumption

of reliance raises a different issue, perhaps unwittingly: Why the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance requires a blind trust in the integrity of the market.

The Basic Court made the presumption of reliance rebuttable rather
than absolute. In the rebuttable presumption, defendants may interrupt
the chain of reasoning that yields indirect reliance. There are two points
in this chain where the presumed reliance may be rebutted. The first is
market efficiency. Efficiency means that prices react to statements.
Absent market efficiency the misstatement would not distort prices and
the fraud-on-the-market presumption would not operate. Since efficiency is far from ubiquitous, this rebuttal is appropriate.9 3 More inter92. Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988).
93. The issue of whether price was influenced by the false statement is central to this step in
the fraud-on-the-market presumption and to its rebuttal, and the misrepresentation's materiality
plays an important role in determining whether the price was influenced. Materiality is tested by
whether the information in the misrepresentation would significantly alter the total mix of
available information about the firm. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 ("We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 context."). Presumably, significant altering of
information results in price changes. Hence it is connected to the issue of whether prices were, in
fact, influenced under the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption. The purpose of the element
of materiality appears to be different from that of reliance. Instead of testing causation,
materiality has the dual purpose of shielding trivial misrepresentations from liability and testing
whether the misrepresentation is likely to influence price. By showing materiality, the plaintiff
implicitly shows that the defendant's statements are likely to have influenced price. This rebuttal
of the presumption of reliance allows the defendant to answer that while his statements were likely
to influence prices, they did not actually affect prices; therefore, the plaintiff was not injured by
the statement. Maybe the market was inefficient and did not take the misrepresentation into
account, or maybe the market was perfectly efficient and saw through the statement's falsity. If
the misstatement did not influence market price, the plaintiff cannot have been injured by simply
transacting at the market price.
In practice, this rebuttal is confused with the "alteration of the total mix of information" test
of materiality. Thus, if prices were not influenced, plaintiffs whose actions fail for lack of
presumed reliance fail for immateriality of the false statements, even if the statements were
important but the market determined that they were false. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:671

esting, however, is whether the presumption of reliance should be
rebuttable even if the market price was influenced by the misrepresentation. Basic allowed rebuttal under those circumstances by hinging the
presumption of reliance on the investor's trust in the integrity of market
price.94 Therefore, if the plaintiff does not trust the market price as

being a fair appraisal of the security's worth, the defendant may rebut
the presumption of reliance and force the plaintiff to plead and prove

actual reliance, even if the market price is influenced.
The following paragraphs will use an actual case of a rebuttal under
this scenario to argue that no rebuttal should be allowed on the grounds
that the plaintiff did not trust the integrity of the market price. I will
argue that this rebuttal exposes informed traders to fraud,95 which is

undesirable because informed traders are the source of market efficiency. 96 This rebuttal is not only undesirable from a policy perspective
Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Schneider v. Apple Computer,
Inc., 496 U.S. 943 (1990):
We conclude that in a fraud on the market case, the defendant's failure to
disclose material information may be excused where that information has been
made credibly available to the market by other sources. The issue with regard to the
bulk of Apple's misstatements is whether, in light of the press' documentation of
[the project's] risks, a rational jury could nonetheless find a 'substantial likelihood'
that full disclosures by Apple would have 'significantly altered the "total mix" of
information made available.'
Id.; see also In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 1991) (following the Apple reasoning); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying the Apple reasoning but rejecting defendants' contention that the market had been otherwise
informed). Notice, by contrast, that an appropriate solution is to reject the presumption itself due
to prices' not being influenced. See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198
(6th Cir. 1990) (stating that non-existence of an efficient market makes the presumption of reliance unavailable) (citations omitted); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
94. The language of Basic is clear. Rebuttal is possible if there was either no influence on
price or if the plaintiff did not trust the fairness of the market price: "Any showing that severs the
link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received . . . or [the plaintiff's]
decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
The Court then gives examples of possible rebuttals very similar to those about to be
analyzed:
For example, a plaintiff who believed that [the defendant's] statements were false
.. . and who consequently believed that [the defendant's] stock was artificially
underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated reasons,
e.g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to divest from shares of
certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he
knew had been manipulated.
Id. at 249.
95. These informed traders are not "insiders" under either Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j-78p (1994) or SEC Rule lOb-5.
96. The activity of informed traders is desirable and beneficial in most U.S. securities
markets. However, there can be too much informed trading. If all market participants are
informed, then prices will be accurate but trading volume will be negligible. As discussed supra
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as Part II showed, but it is also logically inconsistent since market efficiency is the premise of the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
The next paragraphs will argue that this rebuttal is also unnecessary
from a doctrinal perspective. In common law, reliance corresponded to
causation. The presumption of reliance is justified because this causal
link practically always exists in securities fraud. In extraordinary circumstances where causation may be absent, the defendant must rebut the
presumption to show its absence, instead of pleading the avoidable consequences defense that the misrepresentation's injury could have been
avoided by the plaintiff. When formulating the rebuttal we must keep its
function in mind and replicate the avoidable consequences defense in the
setting of securities fraud, just as the justifiability of reliance element
replicated avoidable consequences in common law deceit. The next
paragraphs show that returning to common law causation concepts and
pleading a traditional avoidable consequences defense to reliance replicates the rebuttal's only useful function.
Zlotnick v. TIE Communications9 7 illustrates that requiring the
plaintiff to show blind trust in the integrity of the market before presuming his reliance is wrong because it denies protection to the very class of
traders that ensure this integrity, informed traders. Zlotnick sold short,9 8
then repurchased at a loss the fraudulently inflated stock of a majorityowned subsidiary of TIE Communications. By the time Zlotnick repurchased the stock, TIE had manipulated the price of its subsidiary causing
his loss. The court held that by selling short Zlotnick had manifested his
disbelief in the accuracy of market price, not only at the time of the
sale but also at the time of his repurchase. Since he did not trust the
integrity of the market price, he could not use the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.
in section lID, this leads to a state known as the efficiency paradox, where trading ceases. In
markets that approach this theoretical state, nearly all participants should be presumed to have
information. At that point, large trades will move prices excessively to the trader's disadvantage.
Because of this feature, uninformed traders would find it very costly to participate. I often view
the German stock exchange as an example of a market close to the efficiency paradox, displaying

little volume and little volatility. Some researchers, primarily Professor Robert Shiller, see the
U.S. stock market as excessively volatile. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKEr VOLATILITY (1989)
(collecting his earlier work); Robert J. Shiller, Market Volatility and Investor Behavior, 80 AM.
EcoN. REv. 58 (1990); Robert J. Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular Models, 4 J. ECON.
PERSP. 55 (1990). 1 see volatility as a healthy sign of uninformed trading. Unfortunately these are
personal beliefs that have not been, and maybe cannot be, empirically substantiated. In essence it
is the mix of informed and uninformed traders that ensures proper operation of the markets.
Informed traders bring efficiency; uninformed traders save the market from the efficiency

paradox. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
97. 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988).

98. Short sellers sell shares they do not yet own. First they borrow the shares, betting that the
price of the shares will decline, which will allow the short-seller to repurchase the shares they owe
at a lower price and thus profit from the price drop.
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The result of this reasoning, however, is awkward. If investors
trade because they think a price is attractive, they deny faith in accurate
pricing and waive use of the presumption of reliance, according to the
Zlotnick court. Market participants who correct market inefficiency are
deprived of the benefit of a legal rule based on market efficiency. In
essence, Zlotnick allows manipulators such as TIE Communications to
outwit those who are aware of the manipulation.
The reasoning behind Zlotnick and Basic is consistent: 99 If the
plaintiff does not believe that the market is efficient, he cannot use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Under this theory the presumption exists, in essence, only for the benefit of uninformed investors,
typically long-term diversified investors. Short-term speculators who
bet on fast price fluctuations presumably believe prices are wrong, and
lose the benefit of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Yet efficient
markets depend on the existence of these traders. Their trading corrects
prices and ensures market efficiency. They do not trust the integrity of
market prices, they create it. As a policy matter, informed traders must
be protected against manipulators because their participation guarantees
the efficiency that allows uninformed investors to participate. It is not
only on policy grounds that we must allow informed traders to use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. The causal chain that
fraud-on-the-market represents exists in their case; therefore, their reliance must be presumed.
3.

THE CAUSAL CHAIN BEHIND INFORMED TRADING:
BUT AN AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES

RELIANCE EXISTS

REBUTTAL MAY STILL

BE DESIRABLE

As already explained, the causal chain connecting the defendant's
misrepresentation to the plaintiff's damage is simpler in a developed
securities market than in transactions in real goods. In a securities market, the plaintiff trades at a price influenced by the defendant's statement. The injury caused by trading at the disadvantageous price is
attributable to the defendant's statement, regardless of the plaintiff's
trust in the market's integrity or efficiency.
It is wrong to conclude that this simple concept of causation yields
99. Basic upholds Zlotnick by allowing the presumption of reliance to be rebutted in instances
where the plaintiff has not relied on the integrity of the market. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (finding "[p]etitioners also could rebut the presumption of reliance as to
plaintiffs who would have divested themselves of their Basic shares without relying on the
integrity of the market."). Another case which refuses to protect informed traders in an even more
perverse way is Gianukos v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 822 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1987), where, after

Loeb Rhoades succeeded in persuading Gianukos to trade on information it had fabricated,
Rhoades was able to rebut Gianukos' presumption that he relied on the information.
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problematic results when applied to cases where the plaintiff knows the
misrepresentation is false. The question in that situation is whether traders who knew of the misrepresentation would be given perverse incentives if they were allowed to recover their losses. The question is
justified because disallowing the rebuttal appears to encourage trading
that destabilizes the market. Consider the following scenario: Zlotnick
had not concluded from his own research that the price was excessive
but he had concluded that TIE's optimistic statement was false. Knowing that his reliance could not be rebutted if he bought at the inflated
price, Zlotnick could purchase the stock and have a cause of action
under securities fraud. If such trading were encouraged, it would
reverse the efficiency effect that informed traders have on the market. If
informed traders were to conclude that incorrect statements inflate a
security's price they would buy it instead of selling it and sue under
securities fraud. Their trading, instead of correcting prices, would further distort them.
The fear that in absence of a rebuttal the presumption will give rise
to distortive trading is rational but unjustified. Traders who buy upon
detecting fraudulent inflationary statements must immediately sell to
avoid trading losses equal to their claims under securities fraud for having purchased inflated securities. Transaction costs and litigation costs
make profits from such a strategy unlikely. However, a proper causation
test would avoid this outcome and prevent recovery by distorting traders. Although a causal chain exists between the misstatement and the
plaintiffs' injury, the injury is self-inflicted because the plaintiffs could
have easily and costlessly avoided it by not trading. Because they knew
the price had been influenced, the chain of causation from the misstatement to their injuries is interrupted. A simple example illustrates the
point. Issuer DCT Corporation falsely announces that its earnings rose
20%, causing an analogous rise in the price of its stock. Although the
reasonable trading strategy by those who saw through the misrepresentation is to sell at the new price, they may buy because under the presumption of reliance they will have a claim for the premium by buying at the
inflated price.' 0 Although it appears these buyers paid a premium due
to the market's reliance on the misrepresentation, in fact, the buyers
exposed themselves to this injury because they foresaw it and could
have easily and costlessly avoided it by not trading. So instead of an
elaborate theory of rebutting the presumption of reliance, we have a simpler substitute theory: the common law defense of avoidable conse-

100. In order to avoid losses due to any future price correction, they should also sell the
purchased shares immediately at the same price.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:671

quences.' 0 The trader cannot recover if she could have avoided the
disadvantageous trade. Since she knew the price change disadvantaged
her, she must show that there were other reasons forcing her into the
disadvantageous trade.
Complicating the use of this avoidable consequences defense is the
argument that some plaintiffs should be allowed to recover even if they
knew the misrepresentation was false because they could not avoid trading. At issue is how to determine which plaintiffs may recover and
which may not. Consider, for example, the purchaser of stock on margin (i.e., credit), whose stockholdings are forcibly sold because the
misrepresentation he correctly decoded depresses prices further. °2
Although the purchaser knew the statement was false, he should be
allowed to recover because he was forced to sell. There was no voluntary action of the plaintiff that interrupted the chain of causation from
misstatement to influenced price. The issue is to determine when this
defense can be avoided. Compare the following examples. (1) An
index arbitrageur knows that a certain stock price in the index she is
trading is inflated because of a misrepresentation, but buys it because
her investment strategy requires it. (2) A corporation about to launch a
takeover must divest shares for antitrust reasons, and sells the stock
knowing it is depressed by a misrepresentation. (3) A university fund
manager knows that some stock prices are artificially depressed but must
sell due to political pressures to divest. Basic offers the last two examples as clear rebuttals of the fraud-on-the-market theory for lack of trust
in the market's integrity.' 0 3 This Article suggests it is not clear whether
these rebuttals are desirable.
From a policy perspective having uninformed trading in the market
is beneficial in a different way than having informed traders. The uninformed provide liquidity. The index arbitrageur is a prime example of a
trader who provides invaluable liquidity to the market. Her blind trading
of all the stocks in the index ensures a large trading volume that allows
other funds to flow easily into and out of the market.'1 4 Although these
101. For an explanation of the defense, see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 71: The
theory of avoidable consequences "denies recovery for any damages which could have been
avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.... It is suggested, therefore, that the

theories of contributory negligence and avoidable consequences are in reality the same." Id. at
458-59.
102. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(a)(4)(d) (1991) ("If any margin call is not met in full within the
required time, the creditor shall liquidate securities sufficient to meet the margin call.").
103. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
104. The increased liquidity associated with a stock being part of a popular market index is a
likely source of the price rise and drop associated with inclusion or exclusion from the Standard &
Poor's 500 index. A 3% price increase is associated with inclusion in the index. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Harris & Eitan Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P
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investors provide a less tangible service to the market than the direct
increase in efficiency resulting from informed traders, it is at least as
important. 10 5 We should be reluctant
to impose the cost of scouting for
10 6
information on liquidity providers.
From the perspective of causation we must examine what caused
the trades in the examples. In each one, the defendant's misrepresentation created a price that would have injured a plaintiff. If the plaintiff
was aware of the danger and did not avoid it, then the cause of his injury
is not the defendant's statement but his own decision to trade at the
disadvantaged price. This is a decision subsequent to the misrepresentation, and it interrupts the chain of causation connecting the misrepresen10 7
tation to the injury suffered by trading at the influenced price.
Therefore, the avoidable consequences defense should bar recovery for
fraud-on-the-market, although it does not literally rebut the presumed
reliance. Strictly speaking, the misrepresentation caused the plaintiff's
injury but the causality is interrupted because the plaintiff could have
avoided the injury by not trading. If the plaintiff could not avoid trading, then the misrepresentation is the proximate cause of his injury, and
he should recover.
At issue is the definition of forced or unavoidable actions in the
context of the financial markets. All transactions are to a certain extent
voluntary, even the liquidating transaction after a margin call if it was
clearly foreseeable. At first blush it would appear that a simple cost/
benefit analysis could be applied to determine whether an action is
financially forced. If avoiding the trade would cost more than the
amount by which the misrepresentation changed the price of the security, then the trade would be deemed forced. But one should not rush to
such a conclusion because significant negative externalities appear to
influence the decision not to trade, as Part II explained. The trader
whose actions are typically forced is the uninformed trader, the one who
creates activity and liquidity in the market. Forced trading ensures the
08
trading volume necessary for the market's continued existence.
500 List: New Evidencefor the Existence of PricePressures,41 J. FIN. 815 (1986); Prem C. Jain,

The Effect on Stock Price of Inclusion in or Exclusionfrom the S&P 500, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.Feb. 1987, at 58.
105. Uninformed trading saves the capital markets from falling into the efficiency paradox
trap. See supra note 98, and text accompanying note 48.
106. See supra section IID2a, The Undesirable Incentive to Become Informed.
107. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 71: "The greater number of courts have explained
[contributory negligence] in terms of 'proximate cause,' saying that the plaintiff's negligence is
an intervening, or insulating, cause between the defendant's negligence and the result." Id. at 452.
108. For a theoretical model exposing this effect of forced trading, see Ravi Bhushan, Trading
Costs, Liquidity, and Asset Holdings, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 343 (1991) (constructing a model of

several markets for different securities that may have different liquidity). The article theorizes that
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Focusing this subjective cost/benefit analysis exclusively on the plaintiff
ignores the beneficial effect that his trading has on the market. Financial
economics is very close to quantifying the public benefit that additional
trading volume creates. °9 But until then, law-and-economic analysis
cannot quantify how much forced trading is desireable for the purpose of
barring the avoidable consequences defense.
Part III interpreted the element of reliance in securities fraud and
indirectly argued that fraud-on-the-market practically turns reliance into
a question of whether the misrepresentation influenced prices. To establish reliance under the common law tort of deceit the plaintiff injured by
his own actions has to prove he relied on the defendant's statement.
Thus, in common law, reliance is one link in the chain of causation
connecting an actionable statement to the plaintiff's injury. At the other
extreme is securities fraud, which presumes that the plaintiff relied on
the statement if the plaintiff trusted the integrity of the market price (if
the plaintiff traded without knowing the statement was false).
The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance in securities fraud
consists of two propositions. First, if one trades without information, his
reliance on the misstatement is irrelevant because it will be presumed
the statement caused his injury, while if one trades with information
(believing that prices will give him an opportunity to profit), he cannot
plead securities fraud because his reliance presumption will be rebutted.
This Article argued that these results are contradictory. If efficient
securities markets cause false statements to move prices, the statements
injure all market participants equally, regardless of whether the traders
knew of or ignored the statement and its falsity.
Hinging the presumption of reliance on the plaintiff's ignorance of
the statement's falsity is not only wrong, it is also undesirable for policy
reasons. Securities fraud jurisprudence should aim toward market efficiency, which will in turn lead to optimal resources allocation. Market
efficiency is promoted by savvy, informed traders who can accurately
translate statements into prices. These informed traders, however, are
the very group that the current fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance does not protect. For the market to be efficient, informed traders
must be protected. The fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
needs an efficient market to operate, a market where statements influence prices. Statements influence prices through trading by informed
but for the semi-forced trading of the "noise traders," a class of market participants close to the
uninformed traders of this article, all informed and uninformed trading would concentrate in a
single market. Id. at 344-45.
109. Two recent empirical studies come closest to disentangling the puzzle of the contribution
of trading volume toward liquidity. See Hausman et al., supra note 47; Huang & Stoll, supra note
47.
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traders, and securities fraud must be interpreted to protect them. The
presumption of reliance must depend only on whether the false statement influenced securities prices. 10
The preceding section presented an intuitive theory of reliance
based on absolute loss causation that is only one small step ahead of the
current fraud-on-the-market theory, but much closer to common law
concepts of causation. II If a misrepresentation causes price movement,
there is an injury to each plaintiff. This injury is equal to the fraction of
the price that was changed to the plaintiff's disadvantage. The plaintiff's knowledge that the statement was false is a defense, which functions like avoidable consequences. The plaintiff's voluntary trade is an
intervening cause interrupting the chain of causation connecting the misrepresentation to the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff can avoid this
defense by showing that she was forced to trade. The degree of force
necessary to invalidate the avoidable consequences defense must be set
by accounting for the benefit that trading has for liquidity. Since this
determination is currently impossible, the degree of force should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption of securities fraud conforms to the causal chains observed in
markets for financial goods. Furthermore, the benefits that result from
the fraud-on-the-market presumption address social concerns over false
statements about financial goods by minimizing the danger of transacting at manipulated prices. On the other hand, the structure that actual
110. Oddly, reliance as proof of the cause of the transaction (transaction causation) must retain
its importance in cases where there is no transaction. If a plaintiff were able to plead securities
fraud as the reason for not entering into a transaction that would have been profitable, the plaintiff
must show that he did not enter into the transaction by acting on the misrepresentation.
Although this may seem inconsistent with this article's earlier analysis, it is not. Transaction
causation is unnecessary when there is an open market transaction. The mechanism by which the
market sets nonnegotiable prices makes transaction causation lose importance to price causation.
If there is no transaction on the market, price has not yet become the item of paramount
importance. All other elements of the transaction, most importantly the identity and number of
shares to be bought or sold, remain unspecified. The role of transaction causation in this instance
is to specify all the elements of the transaction not entered into.
Thus, it is not inconsistent to say that a securities fraud cause of action does not exist when
there is no trade. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding no
Rule lOb-5 cause of action if there was no purchase or sale of securities). Plaintiffs who can state
a common law misrepresentation claim can still prevail.
11l. Analogous arguments in favor of pure loss causation have previously been made. See,
e.g., Fischel, supra note 8; Fischel, supra note 18. In contrast to previous arguments, this article
connects reliance in securities fraud to its common law counterpart and shows that loss causation
is not a radical step, but one that follows by necessity if common law causation principles are
applied to securities markets.
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reliance imposes upon the tort of deceit conforms to the causal chains
observed in markets for nonfinancial goods and addresses social concerns about false statements in those markets: False statements result in
the allocation of goods to users other than those who value them the
most. Fraud-on-the-market reliance answers concerns about securities
fraud and matches its goals. Actual reliance answers deceit's concerns
and matches its goals. Several other results of the actual reliance structure show it is appropriate for deceit.
Consider the remedies available to deceit plaintiffs, rescission, or
out-of-pocket damages." 2 Rescission directly remedies the misallocation caused by the deceit. Out-of-pocket damages compensate the victim of the misallocation and substitute for rescission when it is
unavailable or impractical. For example, the buyer of a good who would
derive $1 of use from it but buys it for $3 due to a misrepresentation
would receive out-of-pocket damages of $2. This compensates the $1user buying a $3 good, but does not remedy the misallocation as rescission would.
Neither remedy is appropriate in securities fraud. Allowing only
those who traded in actual reliance on the misrepresentation to recover
has no effect on the avoidance of trading that the fear of erroneous prices
induces. Only if everyone who traded at the influenced price can
recover its inflation or deflation will the traders' fear of incorrect prices
be subdued. This is what fraud-on-the-market achieves. Notice that this
remedy does not correspond to any of the conventional measures of
damages. It is not rescission, which prevents the defrauded buyers from
retaining any profits from the trade earned after the misrepresentation is
uncovered, nor is it out-of-pocket damages, which would mitigate the
damage the misrepresenter owes by any gains his victims may have
derived from the trade. Nor is it benefit-of-the-bargain, which should
give those who were aware of the misrepresentation the stock's implied
value according to the misrepresentation, and thus promote incorrect
prices.
Socially desirable incentives also result from the differences
between fraud-on-the-market and actual reliance. If fraud-on-the-market
rules were to apply in deceit, a misrepresenter of real goods' prices
would have to pay all buyers the difference in price they paid due to his
misrepresentation. But since his misrepresentation would have marginal
or no effect on price, he would pay little or nothing in damages and
112. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 71, at 765. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages are also
awarded in deceit actions. But their use has to be attributed to those circumstances where deceit is
not easy to distinguish from a breach-of-contract claim. In that case their economic justification
would take us into the economics and the law of contracts.
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hence face marginal or no incentives not to misrepresent. Conversely, if
actual reliance was required in securities fraud, an issuer misrepresenting the value of its stock would expect to pay minimal damages because
he would be liable only to those who traded in reliance on the false
statement. Carrying this logic to the extreme, the issuer could ask for a
trading halt, make the false announcement and expect the new opening
price to reflect the misrepresentation, at a price which no speculator
believing the misrepresentation would trade, hence no trader could claim
actual reliance.
The interpretation suggested by this Article is not only desirable
from a policy perspective and consistent with the doctrinal causationchecking function of reliance, but it is also simple for courts to apply.
From the courts' perspective, the administration of an actual reliance
deceit action is preferred over the fraud-on-the-market alternative, as is
the fraud-on-the-market securities fraud action over the actual-reliance
alternative. First, determining the price that a nonfinancial good would
have had but for a misrepresentation-an element of securities fraud
damages-is extremely difficult. By contrast, it is very easy in the case
of financial goods, where standard statistical methods can answer the
question."13 Second, rescinding a real goods transaction is simple, while
a financial goods rescission may involve a series of subsequent transactions. Admittedly, it may be difficult to determine out-of-pocket damages in real goods because it is hard to quantify the owner's actual
benefits and costs. But it is nearly impossible to quantify damages with
financial goods because it is anyone's guess how the injured investors
would have traded without the misrepresentation. It is the gain that
would have resulted from these other transactions that would represent
their damages in an actual reliance, out-of-pocket damage calculation.
Conversely, were the court to consider benefit-of-the-bargain damages
in a securities fraud case, they again would have absolutely no guidance
in determining the price that the stock should have attained had the misrepresentation been true. The statistical inferences available for such
cases are very weak.
This Article defended the desirability of expanding securities fraud
liability through the use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, using a comparative analysis. Fraud in securities is more undesirable than fraud in real goods. Therefore, the fear of securities fraud
liability should create stronger incentives to be truthful than fear of liability in deceit. Although this comparative analysis dictates that securities fraud rules should lead to a greater probability of liability than deceit
rules, it does not establish whether the current securities fraud rules cre113. See, e.g., Brown & Warner, supra note 83.
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ate appropriate deterrence. The issue comes down to balancing the benefits of greater liquidity and a lower cost of capital, which would follow
tougher securities fraud rules and stricter enforcement, against the cost
of securities litigation and compliance. Although the benefits of a lower
cost of capital are readily quantifiable, 1 4 the current state of economic
and financial knowledge does not allow us to appraise the value of
liquidity. More research is needed to answer this question. What is
clear at this stage is that Congress should not eliminate the presumption
of reliance.

114. One can estimate the cost-of-capital advantage of the U.S. securities markets, although it
is not clear whether it should be all attributed to securities regulation. The total capitalization of
U.S. securities markets at the end of 1987 stood at $2,216,000,000,000. Historically, U.S. stocks
return 11.3% as opposed to 14.82% for return of foreign stocks. If the 2.216 trillion dollars of
U.S. equities were priced according to a 14.82% discount rate instead of 11.3%, the total U.S.
market capitalization would fall to $1,664,000,000,000. If the difference in returns is attributable
to liquidity, an alternative source for this difference can be downplayed. The risk difference is
marginal: 17% standard deviation for the U.S., as against 19% abroad. That means the increased
liquidity gains the U.S. $552,000,000,000 of capital. The data is from HANDBOOK OF MODERN
FINANCE, supra note 46, at 18-21 and 10-7.

